Louisiana Law Review
Volume 80
Number 2 Winter 2020

Article 13

4-22-2020

Revitalizing Louisiana's Lost Chance Doctrine: Burchfield v. Wright
Sheds Light on the Need for Medical Expenses
Madeleine K. Morgan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Repository Citation
Madeleine K. Morgan, Revitalizing Louisiana's Lost Chance Doctrine: Burchfield v. Wright Sheds Light on
the Need for Medical Expenses, 80 La. L. Rev. (2020)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss2/13

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Revitalizing Louisiana’s Lost Chance Doctrine:
Burchfield v. Wright Sheds Light on the Need for
Medical Expenses
Madeleine K. Morgan*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 488
I.

The Policy-Driven Road to Adopting Lost Chance
of a Better Outcome ..................................................................... 492
A. Origins of the Lost Chance Doctrine ..................................... 493
B. Lost Chance in Medical Malpractice:
A Cure for What Seemed Impossible .................................... 495
1. The Traditional Negligence Standard’s Limitations ....... 495
2. Lost Chance Doctrine as a Solution ................................ 497
C. The Evolution of the Lost Chance Doctrine in the
United States and Louisiana .................................................. 499
1. Lost Chance Doctrine in the United States:
from Hicks to Herskovitz................................................. 500
2. Development of the Lost Chance Doctrine in
Louisiana: From Hastings to Smith................................. 502
3. Extension of the Lost Chance Doctrine to
“Lost Chance of a Better Outcome”................................ 504
D. Fashioning Lost Chance Remedies: Louisiana’s
Take on Medical Malpractice Damages ................................ 506

II.

The Development of Lost Chance of a Better Outcome
in Louisiana .................................................................................. 511
A. Graham v. Willis-Knighton and Its Evasion
of the Damages Issue ............................................................. 511
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Current Approach .............. 512
1. Cutting into Burchfield v. Wright.................................... 513
2. The Burchfield Opinion: Lost Chance Plaintiffs
May Not Recover Medical Expenses
as Special Damages......................................................... 514

III. Role of Tort Law Fundamentals in Developing
A Lost Chance Remedy................................................................ 516
A. Deterrence of Negligent Treatment ....................................... 517
B. Compensation and Corrective Justice.................................... 519

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 209

4/15/20 8:48 AM

488

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

IV. Complications from Louisiana’s Current
Lost Chance Approach ................................................................. 520
A. Burchfield’s Deference to Smith’s Lump Sum
Approach Lacks Nuance........................................................ 521
B. Lack of an Easily Reviewable Award.................................... 523
C. Fundamental Fairness Issues the
Burchfield Opinion Poses ...................................................... 524
V.

Recovery: Solutions to the Problem Burchfield
Presents in Louisiana.................................................................... 526
A. The Subjective Lump Sum Method Alone
Should Not Apply to Lost Chance......................................... 526
B. The Medical Malpractice Cap Should Not Limit
Lost Chance Plaintiffs’ Recovery of Future
Medical Expenses .................................................................. 527
C. Lost Chance of Survival Plaintiffs Should Recover
Past Medical Expenses .......................................................... 530
D. Implementing a Solution: Louisiana Should Require
Separation of Medical Damages and General
Damages in Awarding Lost Chance Damages....................... 531
1. General “Lump Sum” Damages as Provided
in Smith: Too General ..................................................... 535
2. Percentage Probability Damages:
Not Proportional Enough ................................................ 536
Conclusion.................................................................................... 538
INTRODUCTION

In the Louisiana Supreme Court case Burchfield v. Wright, Dr. Wright,
a physician at Willis-Knighton Medical Center, failed to review
Burchfield’s charts prior to a routine gallbladder surgery.1 Had he
reviewed the charts, Dr. Wright would have discovered that his patient’s
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1. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 857 (La. 2018).
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underlying heart condition necessitated a cardiac consult before surgery.2
Burchfield suffered a heart attack 30 hours after his surgery and eventually
underwent a heart transplant.3 Burchfield and his wife brought suit, but
because Burchfield had a pre-existing heart condition, he was unable to
prove that Dr. Wright’s error alone caused his heart attack and subsequent
heart transplant.4
Reviewing the Burchfields’ case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
allowed the plaintiffs to recover for Burchfield’s lost chance of a better
outcome even though he could not prove that the doctor’s breach caused
his ultimate injuries.5 Generally, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act
(“MMA”) limits total recovery in a medical malpractice case to $500,000.6
The cap, however, does not apply to medical expenses.7 The MMA also
limits a physician’s liability to $100,000.8 If a defendant physician settles
for $100,000, a plaintiff may proceed against the Louisiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund (PCF) for excess damages up to $500,000, exclusive
of medical expenses.9 Despite the fact that the physician in Burchfield
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 858, 863. The causation standard the Court applied was that of
“substantial factor.” Id. at 863. Under this standard, the plaintiff must show the
defendant’s negligence was a “substantial factor in depriving the patient of some
chance of life, recovery, or, as in the instant case, a better outcome.” Id. Under the
substantial factor standard, the defendant’s negligence need not be the only cause
of the plaintiff’s damages, but it must have increased the harm to the plaintiff. Id.
5. Id. at 868. In some instances, a patient may have a pre-existing condition
that puts her chances of achieving a favorable medical outcome below 50%. Tory
A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice: The Need for Caution, 87
MASS. L. REV. 3, 4 (2002). A patient’s pre-existing condition may make it difficult
to discern whether the ultimate malpractice damages stemmed from the preexisting condition or the doctor’s error. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation,
Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions
and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1354 (1981). In this situation, the
“lost chance of a better outcome” theory of recovery allows plaintiffs to recover
damages where a physician deprives the plaintiff of a less than 50% chance to
avoid a bad outcome or advancement of a medical condition. Steven E. Pegalis,
Loss of a Chance, 1 AM. LAW MED. MALP. § 5:3, Westlaw (database updated June
2019). Although not every jurisdiction accepts this doctrine, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had recognized it as a valid means of recovery prior to Burchfield.
See Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So. 2d 365 (La. 1997).
6. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2015).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 40:1231.2(B)(2).
9. Id. § 40:1231.2(D)(5). Since the defendant physician settled pursuant to
this subsection of the MMA, the Burchfields recovered their remaining damages
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breached his duty of care and stipulated to his breach by settling with the
plaintiff for $100,000, the Court did not allow Burchfield to recover any
medical bills as special damages outside of Louisiana’s $500,000 cap on
recovery.10
Burchfield could not return to his job because of the trauma from his
heart transplant.11 To compound the problem, medical bills for his
medications and continued monitoring of his condition were piling up.12
Yet because of the Supreme Court’s holding, he could not recover for past,
present, or future medical bills as a separate, uncapped category of
damages.13 As the law now stands in Louisiana, plaintiffs who experience
a lost chance of a better outcome may not recover medical bills as separate
damages.14 This result is contrary to the legislature’s intent and the
objectives of tort law.15
Tort law’s traditional causation standard, preponderance of the
evidence, requires the plaintiff to prove a greater than 50% chance, or
“more likely than not,” that the defendant’s negligence caused her
damages.16 The lost chance doctrine developed to allow plaintiffs to
recover damages in situations where meeting the traditional causation
requirement was impossible.17 Although courts have traditionally limited
the general doctrine of lost chance to medical malpractice claims, courts
have applied the theory in a wide array of factual variations.18 In the “lost
chance of survival” variation, the survivors of an ill or injured patient who
died from her condition may recover for harm resulting from a physician’s
breach even when the plaintiffs cannot prove that the breach was the cause
of death.19 Even if a patient’s chance to survive the condition at the outset
of treatment was below 50%, a plaintiff can still recover for the lost chance
from the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF), an administrative system
of medical payouts. See Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund, LA. DIV. OF
ADMIN., https://www.doa.la.gov/Pages/pcf/Index.aspx [https: //perma.cc/75SVABV3].
10. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 868.
11. Burchfield v. Wright, 224 So. 3d 1170, 1176 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
12. Id.
13. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 867.
14. Id. at n.5.
15. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2015); Kelty v. Brumfield, 633
So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. 1994) (explaining the Louisiana Legislature’s intent in
including the “future medical care and related benefits” exception).
16. Weigand, supra note 5, at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
18. See, e.g., Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490, 495 (Wash. 2011).
19. See King, supra note 5, at 1354.
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of survival that the physician destroyed.20 In a lost chance of survival
claim, death is the physical consequence, but the recoverable damages
correspond to the lost chance to avoid that consequence.21
In the “lost chance of a better outcome” variation, an ill or injured
patient can recover for a lost chance even after surviving the harm.22 A
plaintiff can bring a claim for lost chance of a better outcome when a
physician negligently misdiagnoses or mistreats an illness or injury,
depriving the patient of a chance of a better prognosis or outcome.23
Although a plaintiff in a lost chance of a better outcome case does not die,
the consequences of the loss can still be extremely grave, as evidenced by
the facts of Burchfield v. Wright.24 Thus, lawyers and judges must examine
the lost chance of a better outcome doctrine with care and with knowledge
of the doctrine’s underlying policies. Medical malpractice cases present
novel issues for the doctrine because each patient inevitably brings a
unique medical history to the table—and that history may affect one’s
ability to prove causation.25
Pre-existing conditions in medical malpractice cases are “unavoidable
realities” that the courts must confront head-on.26 In awarding damages for
a lost chance of a better outcome, courts must question the extent that a
pre-existing condition should affect a plaintiff’s recovery.27 The
Burchfield case does not satisfactorily answer this inquiry for several
reasons.28 First, the opinion is not in harmony with the Louisiana
Legislature’s intent to allow medical malpractice plaintiffs to recover
future medical expenses in excess of the medical malpractice cap.29
Second, the Supreme Court relied on Smith v. State, the cornerstone of the
lost chance damage valuation in Louisiana, without considering the
fundamental difference between speculative damages and readily

20. Matthew Wurdeman, Loss-of-Chance Doctrine in Washington: From
Herskovits to Mohr and the Need for Clarification, 89 WASH. L. REV. 603, 603–
04 (2014).
21. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
22. See Wurdeman, supra note 20, at 605.
23. See King, supra note 5, at 1354.
24. See discussion infra Section II.B; Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855,
858–59 (La. 2018).
25. See King, supra note 5, at 1354.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1360.
28. See generally Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855.
29. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2 (2015).
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calculable damages in lost chance claims.30 By not allowing plaintiffs to
recover any medical bills as a separate damage in lost chance claims, the
Burchfield opinion fails to satisfy the compensatory objective of tort law:
making plaintiffs whole for their losses.31
This Comment proposes how Louisiana should address the
compensation issue in both lost chance of survival and lost chance of a
better outcome cases. This Comment recommends that Louisiana law
should allow plaintiffs to recover medical bills when they have suffered a
lost chance. Further, these medical payments should be separate from the
jury’s lump sum award and should not be subject to the medical
malpractice cap under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1231.2.
Part I of this Comment provides background on relevant law regarding
the lost chance doctrine and will trace the lost chance doctrine’s
development in the United States and Louisiana. Part II articulates
Louisiana’s approach to lost chance of a better outcome damages and will
present the case Burchfield v. Wright. Part III offers an overview of the
tort law objectives underlying lost chance claims. Part IV highlights the
issues that Burchfield raises for the lost chance doctrine. Part V advocates
for an approach that divides the valuation of lost chance damages between
general damages and medical expenses. Requiring separate calculations of
general damages and medical expenses on a trial court’s verdict form is
superior to both the current lumpsum approach32 and a “percentage
probability” approach.33
I. THE POLICY-DRIVEN ROAD TO ADOPTING LOST CHANCE OF A BETTER
OUTCOME
Tort law serves a number of purposes, including compensation,
deterrence, and fairness.34 Scholars commonly take the position that tort

30. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 864 (citing Smith v. State Dep’t of Health &
Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996)).
31. Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance Doctrine:
An Argument for a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 29 (2003);
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
32. Dionne Carney, Smith v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health and
Hospitals: Loss Chance of Survival: The Valuation Debate, 58 LA. L. REV. 339,
361 (1997).
33. See King, supra note 5, at 1382–87.
34. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the
Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 180–200 (2004).
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damages serve to “make the plaintiff whole”35—in other words, to restore
the plaintiff to the condition she would have been in had the injury-causing
event never occurred.36 Damages may also deter potential tortfeasors by
increasing their exposure to liability for a plaintiff’s injuries.37 A number
of states, including Louisiana, have developed the lost chance of a better
outcome claim to more adequately serve the functions of medical
malpractice tort law.38 Cases originally limited the lost chance doctrine to
lost chance of survival cases, but the doctrine later expanded, with courts
eventually recognizing the lost chance of a better outcome as a
compensable interest.39 Through the lost chance of a better outcome
doctrine, courts allowed plaintiffs to recover damages even when they
survived a condition that a defendant’s negligence caused or
exacerbated.40 Before the lost chance doctrine could develop in the
medical malpractice context, however, the law first had to embrace lost
chances in general as compensable interests.41 The origins of the doctrine
shed light on the purpose for which lost chance developed.
A. Origins of the Lost Chance Doctrine
The concept of recovery for a lost chance originated in English
common law, allowing plaintiffs to recover for the lost chance of obtaining
a favorable contractual result.42 The seminal English contract law case,
Chaplin v. Hicks, involved a plaintiff who was one of 50 beauty pageant
35. “The purpose of tort damages is to make the victim whole.” Bellard v.
Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 668 (La. 2008); Rebecca Korzec, Maryland
Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 97, 109
(2007) (stating that making the tort victim whole is the “major compensation
paradigm” of tort law); Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the
Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1577–79 (1997)
(explaining courts have traditionally stated that “to make the victim whole” is the
purpose of tort damages); see also W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 7 (5th ed. 1984); Kalven, supra note 31, at 160.
36. Robert Hernquist, Arthur v. Catour: An Examination of the Collateral
Source Rule in Illinois, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 172–73 (2006); see also King,
supra note 34, at 165.
37. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 605, 627 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490 (Wash. 2011).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Howard Ross Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for
the Loss of a Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 140–41 (1987).
42. Id. at 141.
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participants, 12 of whom would win an acting contract.43 The defendant
failed to timely notify the plaintiff of her selection as a semi-finalist, and
she missed the final evaluation round as a result.44 The plaintiff sued for
breach of contract, and the court recognized her lost chance of winning the
acting contract as a compensable interest.45 Most notably, the court opined
that difficulty in calculating damages could not bar the plaintiff’s
recovery.46 American courts eventually adopted the English common law
approach in contract, allowing plaintiffs to recover pro rata in contract
disputes—meaning that plaintiffs only recovered a certain proportion or
percentage of their damages.47
Although American courts allowed recovery for lost chances in
contract, the courts hesitated to recognize lost chances in tort because the
doctrine threatened to destabilize tort law’s traditional notions of
causation.48 The traditional causation standard—preponderance of the
evidence—requires the plaintiff to prove by a more than 50% likelihood
that a defendant caused the harm.49 The 1938 Ohio Supreme Court case
Kuhn v. Banker reflects the longstanding position of the American courts
toward the preponderance of the evidence causation standard and the lessthan-traditional lost chance doctrine.50 In Kuhn, the plaintiff tried to
recover against a physician for alleged malpractice in treatment of a
broken hipbone.51 Adhering to the traditional preponderance standard, the
Kuhn court held that a lost chance is “not an injury from which damages
will flow.”52 The court reasoned that an abundance of uncertainty
prevented the court from attributing causation to the defendant when the
plaintiff may have had no real chance of recovering from the broken hip,
43. Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786, 787 (C.A. 1911); see also Feldman, supra
note 41, at 140 n.11.
44. Chaplin, 2 K.B. at 788.
45. Id. at 793.
46. Id. at 791.
47. Pro-rata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See Feldman, supra
note 41, at 141. As an example of pro-rata recovery, in Chaplin, the plaintiff recovered
a percentage of the profits she would have received if the defendant’s actions did not
deprive her of the chance of winning the acting contract. 2 K.B. at 786.
48. See Lisa Perrochet, Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding
Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 622 (1992).
49. The greater-than-even, or greater than 50%, standard is simply a
reflection of the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof in civil cases.
Feldman, supra note 41, at 153.
50. Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio 1938).
51. Id. at 243.
52. Id. at 247.
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even without the malpractice.53 American courts continued to mandate the
traditional preponderance of the evidence standard until 1966, when courts
began to take notice of the injustices that persistently applying the
traditional negligence standard could inflict.54 The medical malpractice
landscape has shifted over time in an effort to correct these injustices.
B. Lost Chance in Medical Malpractice: A Cure for What Seemed
Impossible
In the past, American courts did not recognize lost chances in medical
malpractice suits due to the strict causation requirements in tort.55
Recognizing the inequities that a strict preponderance standard of
causation might yield, courts eventually moved away from the traditional
standard’s limitations.56 The remedy for a lost chance varies by state, with
some states adopting methods such as relaxing the “but-for” standard or
redefining the injury as the actual lost chance.57 Each jurisdiction that has
adopted the doctrine, however, has made recovery feasible for plaintiffs
with pre-existing conditions who, before, could not have received any
compensation for their losses.58
1. The Traditional Negligence Standard’s Limitations
Generally, Louisiana tort law requires that a plaintiff alleging medical
malpractice prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the applicable
standard of care, including the ordinary degree of knowledge, skill, and
care that physicians licensed to practice in Louisiana exercise; (2) that the
physician breached the applicable standard of care; and (3) as a “proximate
result” of the breach, the plaintiff suffered injuries otherwise avoidable.59
This standard requires the plaintiff to show that the doctor’s negligence

53. Id. at 246.
54. See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1966). See
generally Fischer, supra note 37, at 627.
55. See Kuhn, 13 N.E.2d at 242.
56. Saroyan, supra note 31, at 29.
57. Weigand, supra note 5, at 6–7; see infra notes 84–86 and cases cited
therein.
58. See Herskovitz v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474
(Wash. 1983).
59. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(A) (2003); see also Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So.
2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994).
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was the cause-in-fact of the patient’s injury and that the breach fell within
the scope of the doctor’s duty to the plaintiff.60
Over time, American courts recognized that the stringent requirement
of but-for causation should not exclusively govern recovery.61 Courts
reasoned that the traditional negligence standard created “obvious
inequities” in cases where a physician’s negligence and pre-existing
conditions combine to cause a plaintiff’s injuries.62 Under the traditional
negligence standard, a plaintiff who cannot prove causation will recover
nothing against a defendant physician who took away a 49% chance of
achieving a certain medical outcome.63 Conversely, another plaintiff could
prove causation and recover full damages against a physician who took
away a 51% chance of achieving a certain medical outcome because the
physician’s fault exceeded a 50% cause of the injury.64 The 50% line, an
expression of the preponderance of the evidence standard, may create
absurd consequences: a mere 2% variation in a physician’s fault—from
49% to 51%—makes the difference between recovering nothing and
recovering everything.65 Applying the strict preponderance standard
essentially releases a doctor from liability when a patient’s initial chance
was below 50%, thus falling short of the deterrence function of tort law.66
Moreover, the standard fails to recognize that a chance at survival or
recovery may be worth a great deal to patients and merits compensation.67
Now, a majority of the 50 states have recognized the traditional standard’s
limitations—a failure to deter physicians from inadequate treatment and a

60. Carney, supra note 32, at 341.
61. Id. at 342.
62. Id.; see also Lauren Guest et al., The "Loss of Chance" Rule as a Special
Category of Damages in Medical Malpractice: A State-by-State Analysis, 21 J.
LEGAL ECON. 53, 54 (2015).
63. Carney, supra note 32, at 342.
64. Id.
65. See King, supra note 5, at 1377; Stephen F. Brennwald, Proving
Causation in “Loss of Chance” Cases: A Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L.
REV. 747, 773 (1985); Weigand, supra note 5, at 6.
66. Herskovitz v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477
(Wash. 1983).
67. See Fischer, supra note 37, at 624 (“Because people value a chance, its
destruction is a thing of value that merits compensation . . . .”). Commentator Nils
Jansen has argued that no matter the nature of the chance, people as a practical
matter always value a chance to avoid harm. See Nils Jansen, The Idea of a Lost
Chance, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1999).

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 218

4/15/20 8:48 AM

2020]

COMMENT

497

failure to properly compensate plaintiffs—and have expanded their laws
accordingly by adopting the lost chance doctrine.68
2. Lost Chance Doctrine as a Solution
Courts had to conceptualize the notion of “lost chances” as
compensable interests because of society’s limited knowledge of future
outcomes.69 Medical experts can project percentages of the approximate
chance of recovery a doctor took away.70 Due to the malpractice, however,
courts cannot know exactly how the patient’s condition would have
progressed otherwise.71 Although science has advanced markedly to give
patients better chances of recovery, science also remains riddled with
uncertainties that might frustrate a plaintiff’s recovery by precluding
definitive proof that a defendant’s negligence caused the harm.72 Thus, the
lost chance doctrine recognizes that proving “but-for” causation of a death
or injury is sometimes a legal impossibility.73 A patient with a pre-existing
68. As of 2017, 26 of the 50 states had adopted lost chance of some form. Jed
Kurzban et al., It Is Time for Florida Courts to Revisit Gooding, 91 FLA. B.J.,
Nov. 2017, at 9, 16 n.8 (collecting 26 cases in which state supreme courts have
recognized the doctrine); see also Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103, 1105–06 (N.H.
2001); King, supra note 5, at 1377.
69. See Fischer, supra note 37, at 618–19 (“Chance is a concept that arises
out of a lack of information.”).
70. “[M]edical science has progressed to the point that physicians can gauge
a patient’s chances of survival to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . .
[S]urvival rates are not random guesses; they are estimates based on data obtained
and analyzed scientifically and accepted by the relevant medical community.” Beth
Holliday, Cause of Action for Medical Malpractice Based on Loss of Chance or
Opportunity for Cure, 73 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 559, § 22 (Westlaw May 2019
Update).
71. See Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 409 (Tex.
1993) (Hightower, J., dissenting).
72. Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1970) (“[M]edicine is not
an exact science.”); Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal
Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 350
(1999) (noting that despite the “advent of evermore sophisticated medical
technology,” physicians are still fallible.); Jim M. Perdue, Recovery for a Lost
Chance of Survival: When the Doctor Gambles, Who Puts Up the Stakes?, 28 S.
TEX. L. REV. 37, 44 (1986) (“[M]edical or scientific uncertainties may make it
impossible for any expert to establish that a given regime of treatment would
probably have restored the patient’s health.”).
73. Steven R. Koch, Whose Loss Is It Anyway? Effects of the “Lost-Chance”
Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV.
595, 604 (2010).
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medical condition who possesses only a 40% chance of recovering at the
time of a doctor’s negligence cannot mathematically show that the
doctor’s malpractice is the proximate cause of her ultimate injury.74 Courts
have recognized that by losing a chance, however, the patient still loses
something of great value: a chance to survive, a chance to avoid grievous
physical and emotional harm, or a chance to achieve a more favorable
outcome.75 The lost chance doctrine, as a result, seeks to bridge the gap
between the law and medical uncertainties by upholding the lost chance
itself as something of value.76
In an influential article, Joseph H. King, Jr., advocated for adopting
the lost chance doctrine as a solution to the inequities that the traditional
causation standard created, asserting that to deny recovery for a plaintiff’s
“statistically demonstrable losses” caused by the defendant “subverts the
deterrence objective of tort law.”77 The adoption of the doctrine in various
jurisdictions now provides plaintiffs with a mechanism to recover for their
losses of certain medical outcomes at the hands of physicians’ negligence,
even when a plaintiff cannot prove that the negligent treatment was the
but-for cause of the death or injury.78
A common thread among the factual variations of the lost chance
doctrine exists when a doctor’s breach prevents the patient from seeking a
certain favorable treatment: once the patient learns of her pre-existing
condition, the window of opportunity for seeking the most ideal treatment
has closed.79 Another thread of cases involves patients who have a preexisting illness or injury at the outset of treatment of which the doctor is
aware, but the doctor fails to render the best possible treatment, causing
the patient to lose the chance of recovering from the pre-existing
condition.80 The unifying theme in these cases is that the negligent
treatment never proves to be the sole cause of the plaintiff’s final
condition; rather, the pre-existing condition and the negligence combine
to cause the ultimate harm.81

74. Perdue, supra note 72, at 44.
75. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 832 (Mass. 2008).
76. See Fischer, supra note 37, at 620, 622–23.
77. King, supra note 5, at 1377.
78. Allen E. Schoenberger, Medical Malpractice Injury: Causation and
Valuation of the Loss of Chance to Survive, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 58 (1985).
79. Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1235 (La. 1994); see also Hargroder
v. Unkel, 888 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004).
80. See, e.g., Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So. 2d 365 (La.
1997).
81. Guest et al., supra note 62, at 54.
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Notably, of the 50 states, 26 have adopted a form of the lost chance
doctrine.82 The lost chance doctrine generally lowers the barriers to a
plaintiff’s recovery, and its method for doing so varies depending on the
jurisdiction.83 The most common approaches include: (1) relaxing the butfor causation standard and instead only requiring the plaintiff to prove that
the negligence was a “substantial factor” in the resulting harm;84 (2)
requiring the percent chance lost to be “substantial”;85 or (3) redefining the
damages in a lost chance case as not the ultimate harm, such as death or
the final injury, but instead awarding the plaintiff for the actual chance
lost.86 These approaches have evolved over time, demonstrating courts’
inclination to craft different remedies that suit the needs of each respective
state.87
C. The Evolution of the Lost Chance Doctrine in the United States and
Louisiana
The lost chance doctrine began to gain acceptance and evolve
throughout the United States as courts built upon the principle for which
82. Kurzban et al., supra note 68, at 8 n.8.
83. See infra notes 84–86.
84. Wurdeman, supra note 20, at 652 n.48; see, e.g., Sharp v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Colo. App. 1985) (“Once a plaintiff has
introduced evidence that a defendant's negligen[ce] . . . substantially increased the
risk of harm . . . , and that the harm in fact has been sustained, it becomes a
question of fact for the jury to determine whether that increased risk of harm was
a substantial factor in producing the harm.”); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp.,
Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 475 (Okla. 1987) (“[T]he jury may determine that the tortious
act of malpractice was in turn a substantial factor in causing a patient’s injury or
death.”); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1289 (Pa. 1978) (“[L]iability could
attach if the negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in bringing
about the death.”).
85. See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 214 (Kan. 1994) (holding that
the plaintiff must prove that defendant was negligent, and that the negligence
caused the plaintiff to suffer damages; moreover, the “damages” have to be a
“substantial” loss of chance, but the court declined to set an exact standard for
what constitutes a “substantial” loss); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589,
592 (Nev. 1991) (holding that, in order to recover, plaintiffs must prove that a
doctor’s actions reduced a “substantial” chance of survival).
86. Louisiana chose not to relax the causation requirement but instead
redefined the injury in lost chance cases as not ultimate harm to the plaintiff, such
as death or an adverse condition, but the lost chance itself. See Smith v. State
Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. 1996).
87. See infra Section I.C.
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King’s article advocated: identifying the compensable value of a chance.88
At last, the courts’ recognition of the doctrine turned into a remedy for
those who previously had none.89 As the doctrine advanced, state courts
were able to shape it to suit their respective jurisdictions. As a result, the
lost chance doctrine took on several forms, but the need for fairness in
compensating patients and deterring physicians persisted in each of its
forms.
1. Lost Chance Doctrine in the United States: from Hicks to
Herskovitz
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first
addressed the possibility of recovery for a medical lost chance in Hicks v.
United States.90 Harry Hicks, the administrator of Greitens’s estate, sued
a physician for negligently misdiagnosing a condition of the small
intestine, which led to the death of Greitens.91 Since Hicks actually
succeeded in proving that the doctor caused Greitens’s death, the court did
not need to rely on the lost chance doctrine.92 The Fourth Circuit, however,
noted that Hicks could recover by proving that the defendant had
“substantially destroyed a chance of survival.”93 The commonly quoted
dicta from Hicks recognizing the possibility of a lost chance recovery
pushed more courts to adopt the lost chance doctrine.94
Although many states now recognize lost chance of a better outcome
as a theory of recovery, the doctrine initially took shape as a more limited

88. Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to
Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 770–71 (1992); King, supra note 5,
at 1353.
89. See generally Keith, supra note 88, at 764–69.
90. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1966).
91. Id. at 629.
92. Feldman, supra note 41, at 145. But see Brennwald, supra note 65, at 757
(arguing that Hicks merely restates the holding of Kuhn v. Banker). Brennwald
further argued that courts have misconstrued the Hicks holding to be the adoption
of a new standard of proof for plaintiffs who can only prove a chance of survival
was lost. Id. at 757 n.80.
93. Even though the expert testimony at trial established that the plaintiff did
suffer the loss of a better-than-even chance of survival, the Hicks court went on
to say as dicta: “The law does not in the existing circumstances require the
plaintiff to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived had she been
hospitalized and operated on promptly.” Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632; see also Feldman,
supra note 41, at 144.
94. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632; Carney, supra note 32, at 344.
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version: lost chance of survival.95 Commentators have recognized that
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital, a lost chance of survival case, was the
first to “expressly authorize recovery under loss of chance.”96 In
Kallenberg, defendant doctors improperly treated the patient, Belle
Kallenberg, for her condition, and her family brought a wrongful death
suit after she passed away.97 A jury found that the Kallenbergs could
recover because a defendant physician deprived Belle of a 20%–40%
chance of survival.98 The court upheld this verdict, recognizing that even
though it was uncertain whether Belle would have recovered, the
physician’s improper treatment deprived her of any remaining chance.99
In adopting lost chance, some courts chose to simply relax causation
requirements.100 For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Hamil v. Bashline adopted a “substantial factor” standard of causation in
a medical malpractice case.101 Referring to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 323(a), the Hamil court reasoned that it did not require strict
causation evidence to allow the case to go to a jury.102 Rather, for the jury
to hear the case, the plaintiff need only present evidence that the
defendant’s negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm to the
plaintiff.103 So long as the jury found that the negligent act was a
“substantial factor” in the harm, a plaintiff could establish causation.104
Through lost chance of survival cases, courts continued to shape the
lost chance doctrine. The landmark Washington Supreme Court case
95. See, e.g., Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974).
96. Id. See also Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small
Price to Pay for Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279, 287 (1996); Keith, supra note
88, at 765 n.32.
97. Mangan, supra note 96, at 288.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); see also
discussion supra note 84.
101. Carney, supra note 32, at 344.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (AM. L. INST.1965):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance
upon the undertaking.
103. Herskovitz v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477
(Wash. 1983).
104. Carney, supra note 32, at 344.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 223

4/15/20 8:48 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

502

[Vol. 80

Herskovitz v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, for example,
advanced the lost chance doctrine even further than Hamil by expressly
holding that a patient’s family could recover for just a 14% reduction in
chance of survival.105 In Herskovitz, the defendant physician failed to
timely diagnose a patient with lung cancer.106 The court found that due to
the defendant’s negligence, the patient lost the compensable interest of a
chance to recover.107 The patient’s family, however, could not receive full
damages, but only those caused directly by the patient’s premature
death.108
In his concurring opinion in Herskovitz, Justice Pearson argued that
the plaintiff’s compensable injury was not death, but rather the chance of
survival lost.109 Justice Pearson’s opinion helped advance the notion that
rather than relaxing the standard of causation, courts should simply
reconceptualize the injury for which the plaintiff recovers.110 Redefining
the injury as a lost chance allowed courts to maintain the traditional butfor standard.111 Rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove that the
physician’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing their harm,
courts could simply require each plaintiff to prove that “but for” the
physician’s negligence, the plaintiff would not have lost a chance of
survival.112 Four years after Washington decided Herskovitz, the lost
chance trend reached Louisiana.113
2. Development of the Lost Chance Doctrine in Louisiana: From
Hastings to Smith
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not adopt the doctrine of lost chance
until 1987.114 Similar to other jurisdictions, Louisiana courts originally
limited the doctrine to the lost chance of survival context.115 In Hastings
105. Herskovitz, 664 P.2d at 476.
106. Id. at 474.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Herkovitz court noted that the damages that directly related to a
patient’s premature death included medical expenses and lost earnings.
109. Id. at 487.
110. Carney, supra note 32, at 345.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713, 715 (La. 1987);
Herskovitz, 664 P.2d at 477.
114. Hastings, 498 So. 2d at 715.
115. See Herskovitz, 664 P.2d at 477; Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490 (Wash.
2011).
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v. Baton Rouge General Hospital, a lost chance of survival case, the
defendant emergency room doctor treated the decedent at a private
hospital for stab wounds.116 The defendant transferred the patient to a
public hospital for an emergency surgery because the patient did not have
insurance to cover his treatment at the private hospital.117 The patient died
from cardiac arrest after doctors disconnected him from a chest pump
while loading him into the ambulance.118
Citing Hicks, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did
not need to show that the decedent would have survived absent the
defendant’s breach.119 The Hastings Court found that when a physician
destroys any “substantial possibility of survival,” the physician is
answerable because the negligence precludes any possibility of knowing
what would have happened otherwise.120 Although the Hastings Court was
the first to allow a jury to hear evidence on a lost chance of survival theory
of recovery, the Court did not reach the issue of valuing lost chance
damages.121 Lacking a clear rule, Louisiana trial and appellate courts were
split on the issue until 1996, when the Louisiana Supreme Court settled
the matter with Smith v. State Department of Health and Hospitals.122
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith to address
the nature of a lost chance of survival claim and established a rule for
valuing damages.123 In the facts of Smith, hospital staff negligently failed
to inform the plaintiff of an x-ray that revealed a mass in his trachea.124
Nearly 15 months later, the plaintiff returned to the hospital complaining
of chest pain, fever, and chills.125 A chest x-ray revealed that the mass had

116. Hastings, 498 So. 2d at 715.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 716.
119. Id. at 720.
120. Id.
121. The Hastings Court only ruled on the issue of whether or not the trial
court erred in granting a directed verdict for the defendants. Id. at 721–23; Carney,
supra note 32, at 347.
122. Carney, supra note 32, at 352 (“Before Rachel Smith, the loss of a chance
cause of action was anything but clear. Not only did the courts have no clear
indication of how to value these damages, but they were also left without an
articulate test for finding liability. However, with the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Rachel Smith, the uncertainty was finally resolved.”).
123. See generally Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543
(La. 1996). For an in-depth summary of the Smith case, see Carney, supra note
32, at 339.
124. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 545.
125. Id.
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doubled in size.126 Doctors then diagnosed the plaintiff with lung cancer at
an “extensive” stage, and the plaintiff underwent chemotherapy but
ultimately died four months later.127
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the patient in Smith lost a
chance of survival.128 On the issue of damages, the appellate court found
full wrongful death damages for the loss and simply reduced them by the
percentage of chance lost.129 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this
approach.130 Rather, the Smith Court held that the lost chance itself is a
“distinct compensable injury,” and a jury is to subjectively determine the
value of the chance lost as a “lump sum” award based on all of the
evidence in the record, as is done for any other general damages.131 The
Court reasoned that when a jury must find a hypothetical amount of
general damages for the wrongful death of a patient, reduced by a finding
of percentage chance lost, the calculation involves too many speculative
numbers.132 Since the general damages for a lost chance could not be
calculated with mathematical certainty, simply allowing the jury to assign
a lump sum was in harmony with the subjective nature of the loss.133 Other
states’ courts have applied this same approach of redefining the injury in
other contexts besides lost chance of survival.134 The lost chance of a
“better outcome” or “better recovery” claim gained acceptance over time,
and the doctrine’s progression raised new issues of damages and
valuation.135
3. Extension of the Lost Chance Doctrine to “Lost Chance of a
Better Outcome”
Previously, other states recognized lost chance of survival but still
held the view that a plaintiff had no cause of action for a loss of chance

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 548.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. (“When these total hypothetical damages are reduced by a
numerical factor determined from evidence of percentage rates of survival for
certain periods after discovery of the disease at various stages of the disease, the
uncertainty progresses geometrically.”).
133. Id. at 550.
134. See, e.g., Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490, 495 (Wash. 2011).
135. See discussion infra Part II.
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when the ultimate harm was not death.136 Over time, states adopted a more
progressive view—that a plaintiff may recover even when the plaintiff
survives the malpractice.137 This “lost chance of a better outcome” theory
resembles the lost chance of survival claim, but the ultimate harm138 is
different.139 Rather than death, the ultimate harm suffered in a lost chance
of a better outcome case is the advancement, hastening, or worsening of
the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition.140 As a result, the patient survives
her pre-existing injury or illness, but she cannot meet the “extent or quality
of recovery” that she otherwise would have without the doctor’s breach.141
Although a few scholars have questioned the basic wisdom of the lost
chance doctrine, disagreement over the proper way to value lost chance
damages has prompted a much larger debate in which Louisiana courts
have generally settled on the Smith lump sum method.142 The doctrine’s
progression from “lost chance of survival” to “lost chance of a better
outcome” also raises the question of whether the two injuries should be
valued in the same manner.143 Further, a recent Louisiana lost chance case,
Burchfield v. Wright, raised the issue of whether special damages, such as
medical expenses and lost wages, should be available to a lost chance
plaintiff.144 As Louisiana struggles to craft a remedy that suits the needs of
136. See, e.g., Weymers v. Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 655 (Mich. 1997); Keith
W. Lapeze, Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisiana, 58 LA. L. REV.
249, 278 (1997).
137. See, e.g., Smith v. Providence Health & Servs., 393 P.3d 1106, 1120 (Or.
2017); Mohr, 262 P.3d at 495; Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So. 2d
365 (La. 1997); Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 202 (Kan. 1994); Aasheim v.
Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 827 (Mont. 1985).
138. To clarify, “ultimate harm” here refers to the final condition resulting
from the combination of the patient’s pre-existing condition and the doctor’s
negligence, not the distinct tort injury for which the lost chance plaintiff may
recover. See Wurdeman, supra note 20, at 620; Todd S. Aagaard, Identifying and
Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1998).
139. See generally King, supra note 5, at 1353.
140. Id.
141. Mohr, 262 P.3d at 495; Delaney, 873 P.2d at 202.
142. “Proponents of the doctrine have proffered arguments for why the law
should compensate plaintiffs in lost chance cases without addressing what the
compensation should be.” Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1338. Compare Weigand,
supra note 5, at 21, and Perrochet, supra note 48, at 615, with Truckor, supra note
72, at 350.
143. Compare Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018) with Smith v.
State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
144. See generally Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855. “The acceptance of the loss of
a chance theory raises unique issues in the area of damage recovery.” Robert A.
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both the lost chance of survival plaintiff and the lost chance of better
outcome plaintiff, Louisiana’s medical malpractice law demonstrates the
issues present in Burchfield.145
D. Fashioning Lost Chance Remedies: Louisiana’s Take on Medical
Malpractice Damages
The true quality and extent of a plaintiff’s recovery will hinge not only
on the amount but also on the nature of damages a plaintiff receives in a
lost chance claim.146 In a negligence action, a plaintiff can potentially
recover special damages, general damages, or a combination of both.147
Special damages, otherwise known as economic damages, have a readily
determinable value.148 A jury can typically determine an award of special
damages with relative certainty.149 In most medical malpractice actions,
special damages may include lost wages, past medical expenses, and
future medical expenses.150
The other kind of recoverable damages in a medical malpractice action
are general damages, or noneconomic damages, which a jury usually
cannot calculate with mathematical certainty.151 The jury will thus
determine general damages—pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
similar harms—because of the damages’ subjective nature.152 Further,
awarding general damages requires fact-specific inquiries, and the jury has

Reisig, Jr., The Loss of A Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An
Overview, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1163, 1182 (1990).
145. Compare Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855, with Smith, 676 So. 2d 543.
146. See King, supra note 34, at 164–67 (2004) (arguing that damages related
to loss of earning capacity and medical expenses will more adequately make a tort
victim whole, as opposed to classic pain and suffering damages).
147. Urquhart v. Spencer, 224 So. 3d 1022, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
148. Antley v. Rodgers, 251 So. 3d 607, 624 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2018).
149. Id.
150. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 51 So. 3d 874, 883 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010).
151. Urquhart, 224 So. 3d at 1032; Boutte v. Hargrove, 290 So. 2d 319, 322
(La. 1974).
152. Urquhart, 224 So. 3d at 1032; see also Doe v. McNulty, 630 So. 2d 825,
827–28 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993). There is “no obvious way to translate an
intangible, nonmonetary injury into a monetary award. Moreover, there is no
objective test that measures the severity of the victim’s pain and suffering injury.”
Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773,
776 (1995). Thus, the determination of general damages is best left to the
discretion of the jury.
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the benefit of seeing the witnesses and evidence at the trial court level.153
As a result, appellate courts owe great deference to the fact-finder’s award
of general damages and may only overturn an excessively high or
abusively low award upon a finding of abuse of discretion.154 Thus, courts
tend to vest great responsibility in the jury to account for the subjective
losses stemming from medical malpractice.155
Specific to a lost chance of survival claim, the recoverable damages
include funeral expenses, loss of consortium, past medical expenses,
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and future lost wages.156 Other than
future lost wages, past medicals, and funeral expenses, these damages are
all general, subjective damages.157 Similar to a lost chance of survival
claim, the damages potentially recoverable in a lost chance of a better
outcome claim include loss of consortium, emotional distress, pain and
suffering, permanent physical injury, disability,158 past medicals,159 future
lost wages, and, in the appropriate case, a decreased life expectancy.160
The special damage of future medical bills, however, is particularly
prevalent in a lost chance of a better outcome claim because, unlike a lost
chance of survival patient, the patient who loses a chance of a better
outcome does not die but rather lives on to incur future medical bills.161
Since general damages are subjective in nature and difficult to
calculate, the jury uses its discretion to award these damages based on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.162 State legislatures have
worried that juries without sufficient guidance may award an
inappropriately high amount of damages.163 Further exacerbating the
153. Boutte, 290 So. 2d at 321–22. In upholding the jury’s discretion, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned: “Adequacy or inadequacy of an award should
be determined by the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case under
consideration. Additionally, the jury or trial judge has the advantage of seeing the
witnesses and hearing and evaluating the testimony given at trial.” Id.
154. Id.
155. Urquhart, 224 So. 3d at 1032.
156. Holliday, supra note 70, § 27 (2016).
157. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
158. See, e.g., Pesses v. Angelica, 165 So. 3d 131 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014).
159. See, e.g., Greer v. Lammico, 779 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2000).
160. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 866 (La. 2018); Holliday, supra
note 70, § 27.
161. See Mohr v. Grantham, 262 P.3d 490 (Wash. 2011).
162. Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Finding a Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS:
CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 137 (2012).
163. Starting with California in 1975, a number of states addressed this
concern with noneconomic damage caps in medical malpractice cases. Id.
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problem, these excessively high awards are difficult to overturn because
an appellate court affords great deference to the jury’s finding.164 Inflated
jury verdicts also expose doctors to greater potential liability, prompting
concerns within the insurance industry.165
The main concern with excessive jury awards was that liability
insurers would increase their insurance rates to match an increase in
medical malpractice judgment amounts.166 Members of the Louisiana
Legislature believed that excessively high jury awards and rising medical
malpractice insurance were culprits of the insurance crisis in the 1970s.167
In response to the purported insurance crisis,168 the Louisiana Legislature
adopted the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) in 1975, which fixed a
statutory limit of $500,000 on the total amount of damages recoverable for
“injuries to or death of a patient.”169 With the MMA, the legislature
intended to stabilize the health care industry and ensure affordable care to
the public.170 Louisiana’s cap under the MMA has endured, with the
Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirming the constitutionality of the cap in
2012.171 In Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, the Louisiana Supreme Court
explained that the right to recover damages in a malpractice claim is not a
constitutional right, and even though the cap discriminates based on

164. Carney, supra note 32, at 361; see also Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So. 2d
131, 134 (La Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
623 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1993)) (“The standard for appellate review of general
damages awards is difficult to express . . . . [T]he requirement of an articulated
basis for disturbing such awards gives little guidance as to what articulation
suffices to justify modification of a generous or stingy award.”).
165. Sarah M. Nickel, The Medical Malpractice Cure: Stitching Together the
Coleman Factors, 78 LA. L. REV. 311, 315 (2017).
166. Beverly P. Spearman, Tort Law—The Supreme Court Provides a Remedy
for Injured Plaintiffs Under the Theory of Loss of Chance—Alberts v. Schultz, 30
N.M. L. REV. 387, 400 (2000).
167. See Nickel, supra note 165, at 315.
168. The “insurance crisis” refers to a time in the 1970s when malpractice
insurance premiums were rising “drastically,” causing insurers to withdraw from
the market. In Louisiana, four malpractice insurers withdrew from the market,
leaving only two insurers to provide coverage for medical liability. Nickel, supra
note 165, at 315; Emily Townsend Black Grey, The Medical Malpractice
Damages Cap: What Is Included?, 60 LA. L. REV. 547, 547 (2000).
169. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2015).
170. See Luther v. IOM Co., 130 So. 3d 817, 922 (La. 2013); Hutchinson v.
Patel, 637 So. 2d 415 (La. 1994).
171. See Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012).
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physical condition,172 it substantially furthers a legitimate state interest:
lowering malpractice insurance costs for practitioners, which thereby
lowers medical costs and ensures accessible, affordable health care for the
public.173 Thus, the Court viewed the cap as a reasonable compromise
between private interests and public interests.174 Even though the cap
discriminated against more gravely injured plaintiffs whose damages
exceeded $500,000, the Court found that those plaintiffs would still benefit
from an “alternative remedy”—a higher likelihood of available funds to
compensate for their losses.175
The $500,000 cap does not distinguish between economic and
noneconomic damages; rather, it caps the “total amount recoverable,”
subject to some exceptions.176 The Louisiana Legislature recognized that
the cap adversely affected plaintiffs who were severely injured and
incurred higher amounts of medical expenses.177 Instead of simply raising
the cap as other states had done, Louisiana chose to utilize an
administrative medical relief program—the Louisiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund—to pay for severely injured plaintiffs’ medical
expenses.178 Toward this end, in 1984, the legislature amended the MMA’s
cap on medical malpractice damages to allow plaintiffs to recover for

172. Id. at 44–45 (“[T]he medical malpractice cap creates two classes: those
who are fully compensated by an award equal to or less than $500,000.00 and
those whose severity of injuries require an award in excess of $500,000.00 and
who, therefore, receive less than full compensation. The separate statutory
classification discriminates on the basis of physical condition.”).
173. Id. at 45; Natalie J. Dekaris & Michael C. Mims, Recent Developments:
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Law, 74 LA. L. REV. 873 (2014).
174. See Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 45. There are three benefits to medical
malpractice plaintiffs that justify the cap: “(1) a greater likelihood that the
offending physician or other health care provider has malpractice insurance; (2) a
greater assurance of collection from a solvent fund; and (3) payment of all medical
care and related benefits.” Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607
So. 2d 517, 521 (La. 1992).
175. See Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 45.
176. Dekaris & Mims, supra note 173, at 883.
177. Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. 1994).
178. See id. at 1217–18.
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future medical care and related benefits179 that exceed the $500,000 cap.180
Louisiana jurisprudence has interpreted this provision to include “all past,
present, and future medical and related care services” that a physician’s
malpractice necessitated.181 By amending the MMA, the legislature
intended to remedy the cap’s “harsh tendency to prune recovery inversely
to the injury” by allowing recovery for necessary medical expenses in
excess of $500,000.182 Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has found
that where the MMA addresses the cap’s adverse effect upon severely
injured plaintiffs with “mitigating benefits or advantages,” those benefits
must be liberally construed.183 The severely injured plaintiff falls within
the exact class of individuals that the legislature intended to protect with
the 1984 amendment, yet Louisiana’s approach to lost chance claims still
does not provide adequate medical compensation for this class.184 By
requiring an award of all damages in a lump sum—which is subject to the
cap—Louisiana’s approach denies plaintiffs of needed medical bills in lost
chance cases, which is in direct contradiction with the MMA’s intent.185
179. Id. at 1217. The statute defines “future medical care and related benefits”
as “[a]ll reasonable medical, surgical, hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and
custodial services and includes drugs, prosthetic devices, and other similar
materials reasonably necessary in the provision of such services.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 40:1231.3(B)(1)(a) (2015).
180. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2; Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39, 47
(La. 2012) (citing approvingly to Kelty, 633 So. 2d at 1217).
181. “The objects of the provisions are fairly clear and simple. First, the added
MMA provision comprehends all past, present, and future medical and related
care services necessitated by a qualified health care provider’s malpractice—not
just what is usually thought of as ‘future’ medical needs.” Kelty, 633 So. 2d at
1217; see also Dekaris & Mims, supra note 173, at 887; Grey, supra note 168, at
549.
182. Kelty, 633 So. 2d at 1216–17; see also Sarah R. Levin, The Medical
Malpractice System and the Payment of Future Medical Damages: On Life
Support Elsewhere, Resuscitated in Louisiana, 68 LA. L. REV. 955, 969 (2008)
(advocating for other states to adopt Louisiana’s system of paying out medical
expenses to tort victims).
183. Kelty, 633 So. 2d at 1216. The Kelty Court hinted that a failure to liberally
construe these “mitigating benefits”—future medical expenses—could result in
an equal protection violation. Id. If the cap applied evenly to both classes but the
MMA provided no supplemental payments to severely injured plaintiffs, there
would be a “disparity of treatment” between the two classifications of claimants:
severely injured plaintiffs whose damages exceed the cap and those whose
damages do not exceed the cap. Id. (citing Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294
(La. 1989)).
184. See generally Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
185. Kelty, 633 So. 2d at 1216–17.
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As the lost chance of a better outcome theory gained acceptance in
Louisiana, a noticeable tension arose between the MMA’s cap on damages
and the cap’s exception for medical expenses.186
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOST CHANCE OF A BETTER OUTCOME IN
LOUISIANA
Beginning with Graham v. Willis-Knighton in 1997, the Louisiana
Supreme Court extended its lost chance of survival principles to lost
chance of a better outcome.187 Graham recognized the lost chance of a
better outcome as a cognizable injury but left the lower courts without
sufficient guidance in fashioning damages.188 Louisiana courts faced with
the matter continually deferred to the reasoning in Smith, applying the
“lump sum” method to both kinds of lost chance claims.189 The question,
however, remained: what exactly is encompassed in the lump sum?
Burchfield v. Wright, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s most recent lost
chance of a better outcome case, provided an answer as to the nature of the
remedy and how it interacts with the medical malpractice cap.190
A. Graham v. Willis-Knighton and Its Evasion of the Damages Issue
In Graham, the first Louisiana Supreme Court case to recognize the
lost chance of a better outcome theory, the patient, Melvin Graham,
arrived at the Willis-Knighton Medical Center after he was shot in the
abdomen.191 The treating physician stopped Graham’s internal bleeding
but failed to timely summon a surgeon to perform a revascularization of
the patient’s leg.192 Nearly four hours after the intestinal surgery, doctors
transferred Graham to another hospital for the revascularization, but his
leg ultimately had to be amputated.193
186. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
187. Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So. 2d 365 (La. 1997).
188. “The cited cases on the ‘loss of chance’ cause of action provide little
guidance to this Court in fashioning a damage award in the absence of more specific
evidence.” Pesses v. Angelica, 165 So. 3d 131, 143 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014).
189. See, e.g., id. at 131; Bianchi v. Kufoy, 53 So. 3d 530 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2010); Hargroder v. Unkel, 888 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004).
190. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 866–67 (La. 2018).
191. Graham, 699 So. 2d at 366.
192. Interestingly, it appears that the treating physician in Graham, Dr. Forrest
Wright, was the same physician that treated the Burchfield plaintiff over 20 years
later. Id. at 369.
193. Id. at 366.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the delay diminished the
window of opportunity for a successful revascularization194 of the patient’s
leg, therefore requiring amputation.195 Citing Smith, the Court noted that
the loss of a less-than-even196 chance of survival—or chance of saving a
leg—is a distinct, compensable injury, and the fact-finder should make a
subjective determination of the value of that loss.197 Reasoning that: (1)
the trial court’s original award for $470,000 was for the full value of a lost
leg rather than the value of the lost chance of saving the leg; and (2) the
plaintiff lost a less-than-even chance of between 20% and 33%, the Court
reduced the damages to $140,000.198
Although Graham recognized a cause of action for a “better chance of
recovery” and used the Smith lump sum approach to value the damages,
the Graham Court’s significant reduction in the award left unsettled the
issue of exactly what a plaintiff may recover in a case involving the lost
chance of a better outcome.199 Following Graham, several Louisiana
courts of appeal addressed the issue of valuation of a lost chance of a better
outcome, but the approach remained unclear.200
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Current Approach
In June 2018, the Louisiana Supreme Court heard Burchfield v.
Wright, wherein the Court dealt with damages for lost chance of a better
outcome, which previously lacked a clear valuation method.201 Ultimately,
the Court held that a lost chance of a better outcome plaintiff may not

194. A revascularization procedure restores the blood circulation to an organ
or certain part of the body. See Revascularization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revascularization [https://perma.cc
/2X6P-Y5UE] (last visited Sep. 18, 2018).
195. Graham, 699 So. 2d at 373.
196. The language “less-than-even,” as the Smith and Graham Courts used it,
means a less than 50% chance. Id. See also Smith v. State Dep’t of Health &
Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. 1996).
197. Graham, 699 So. 2d at 373.
198. Id. Notably, the Graham decision focused on the standard of proof for
causation in the lost chance of a better outcome claim. It found that the defendant
doctor’s admission of liability alone was not sufficient proof of causation of
damages.
199. Id.
200. See Pesses v. Angelica, 165 So. 3d 131 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014);
Bianchi v. Kufoy, 53 So. 3d 530 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010); Hargroder v. Unkel,
888 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004).
201. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 860 (La. 2018).
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recover medical bills independent from a jury’s lump sum award or
recover medical bills in excess of the medical malpractice cap.202
1. Cutting into Burchfield v. Wright
On August 14, 2013, Roger Burchfield arrived at Willis-Knighton
Medical Center in preparation for an elective gallbladder surgery.203 His
surgeon, Dr. Wright, ordered pre-operative tests, including a chest x-ray
and an electrocardiogram.204 The x-ray would have revealed to Dr. Wright
that Burchfield had congestive heart failure,205 and the EKG would have
revealed possible heart blockages, an intraventricular block, and two
possible prior heart attacks.206 Dr. Wright, however, never looked at the
test results and did not know that Burchfield needed a pre-operative
cardiac consultation.207 Burchfield similarly did not know of his heart
ailments prior to the surgery.208 Without any sense of what grave
consequences would follow, the doctors put Burchfield under general
anesthesia, and Dr. Wright performed the gallbladder surgery.209
Initially, the surgery was successful. With no apparent complications,
the hospital discharged Burchfield that same day.210 Some 30 hours later,
however, Burchfield began to experience edema in his lower
extremities.211 Upon going to the emergency room, doctors determined
that he was in critical condition.212 He had suffered a heart attack,
respiratory failure, worsening of his pulmonary edema, congestive heart

202. Id. at 868.
203. Id. at 858.
204. Id. An electrocardiogram, or an EKG, is a procedure in which a doctor
measures the electrical activity of the patient’s heart by attaching electrodes to the
body. Through this procedure, the doctor is able to check heart rhythm, diagnose
a heart attack, and diagnose other heart abnormalities. Heart Disease and
Electrocardiograms, WEB MD, https://www.webmd.com/heart-disease/electro
cardiogram-ekgs#1 [https://perma.cc/P8MU-6E7J] (last visited Dec. 24, 2019).
205. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 858.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. Edema is the medical term for swelling, which is often a symptom of
congestive heart failure. Edema, MAYOCLINIC.ORG, https://www.mayoclinic
.org/diseases-conditions/edema/symptoms-causes/syc-20366493 [https://perma.c
c/9M2R-G5J9] (last visited Sep. 19, 2018).
212. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 858.
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failure, and a buildup of fluid in his lungs.213 Doctors placed Burchfield in
a medically induced coma; an intra-aortic balloon pump214 and ventilator
kept him alive.215 Burchfield was not a candidate for heart bypass surgery,
so Burchfield underwent a heart transplant on September 3, 2013.216
Although the transplant was successful, Burchfield will continue to
undergo treatment for the heart transplant for the rest of his life, and he
will pay about $1,718.78 per month for medication.217 He was also unable
to return to his job due to its strenuous nature, and he lost approximately
$493,020 in future wages.218 The life expectancy for heart transplant
patients is 13 years; Burchfield was 58 years old at the time of the
malpractice.219 Burchfield and his wife brought suit; the defendant
physician settled for $100,000, and the trial proceeded against the
Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund.220
2. The Burchfield Opinion: Lost Chance Plaintiffs May Not Recover
Medical Expenses as Special Damages
At trial, the jury found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
defendant’s breach caused the heart attack and subsequent heart transplant,
but the breach did result in the lost chance of a better outcome, with that
chance being below 50%.221 The verdict form asked the jury seven
questions, but the judge only gave the jury the option to award specific
damages if it found causation.222 The verdict form asked the jury to award
213. Id.
214. An intra-aortic balloon pump is a therapeutic device that helps one’s heart
pump blood. The balloon intermittently deflates and inflates according to one’s
heartbeat, allowing blood to either stay in the heart or flow out with each
contraction. Intra-Aortic Balloon Pump Therapy, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/intra-aortic
-balloon-pump-therapy [https://perma.cc/G3UY-Q3UX] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
215. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 858.
216. Id. at 859.
217. Id. at 859, 868.
218. Id.
219. Burchfield v. Wright, 224 So. 3d 1170, 1177 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
220. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 858. When a plaintiff has damages in excess of
$100,000 in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff may proceed against the
PCF for the remaining damages. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(D)(5) (2015).
221. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 859.
222. The jury verdict form had seven questions. question number one asked
the jury whether Dr. Wright’s breach was a “substantial factor” of the injuries of
the plaintiff. If the jury answered “Yes,” they were directed to question numbers
two through five, which concerned damages for “past and future pain and
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one lump sum if they found that the plaintiffs had suffered a lost chance
of a better outcome.223 The jury awarded $680,000 for the Burchfields’
lost chance, but the trial court reduced the award to $400,000 pursuant to
the MMA’s limitation on recovery and the plaintiff’s previous $100,000
settlement with the doctor.224
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the plaintiff had suffered a lost chance of a better
outcome, but it found that the trial court incorrectly subjected part of the
damages award to the MMA’s cap.225 The court of appeal reasoned that
the trial court erred by not awarding special damages for lost wages and
future medical care and that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury
on how to value the claim on the verdict form.226 Relying on Bianchi v.
Kufoy—in which the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal awarded
medical expenses and lost wages as a separate, uncapped damage—the
Second Circuit in Burchfield similarly awarded special damages:
$493,020 in lost wages, $692,850 in past medical expenses, and future
medical care.227 The Second Circuit reduced neither the lost wages nor the
medical expenses pursuant to the MMA’s cap on damages.228
The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently reviewed Burchfield,
determining that the appellate court erroneously awarded damages for past
medical expenses, future medical care, and lost wages.229 The Court
further found that any award compensating the plaintiff for special
damages should be reduced under the MMA cap.230 It held that the lump
suffering, past and future disability, past medical expenses, past lost wages, future
lost wages, future medical care, and loss of consortium” for the plaintiff’s wife.
Because the jury answered “No” to question number one, the Verdict Form
directed them to proceed to question number six, which asked whether the
plaintiff suffered a lost chance of a better outcome. The jury answered “Yes” to
question number six. Question number seven then asked them to provide a
damage amount for the lost chance of a better outcome. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. If a physician settles with a plaintiff, the plaintiff may proceed against
the PCF for the remaining damages. In that case, the court “shall reduce any
judgment to the plaintiff in the amount of malpractice liability insurance in force.”
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(D)(5). Thus, in Burchfield, the trial court properly
subtracted the $100,000 settlement from the plaintiff’s $500,000 judgment.
Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 859.
225. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 860.
226. Id.
227. Id.; Bianchi v. Kufoy, 53 So. 3d 530 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010).
228. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 860.
229. Id. at 866–68.
230. Id. at 866.
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sum method of valuation from Smith applied to lost chance of a better
outcome.231 The Court stated that the jury must consider all of the evidence
in awarding damages, including the expert medical testimony estimating
chances of survival, and assign a number to the loss.232 Finally, the Court
opined that a jury may still look at evidence of special damages in making
its award, but any finding of special damages will be included in the lump
sum and will be subject to the $500,000 cap.233
As an effect of the Court’s holding, the plaintiff was not able to
recover any medical expenses pursuant to the MMA’s exception of “future
medical care and related benefits.”234 Any medical expenses the jury
awarded were encompassed within the lump sum and were not separated
as an itemized damage.235 Accordingly, the Court reinstated the trial
court’s award of $400,000 pursuant to the defendant physician’s
settlement and the MMA cap.236 Since the Burchfield decision simply
deferred to Smith without accounting for the plaintiff’s need for medical
compensation, the decision fell short of a number of principles that should
guide courts in developing new areas of tort law.
III. ROLE OF TORT LAW FUNDAMENTALS IN DEVELOPING A LOST
CHANCE REMEDY
One commentator reflected that tort law is “a battleground for social
theory and policy,” recognizing that tort law is an expression of the social
will—more so than any other area of the law.237 As such, tort law in the
states is constantly in flux as the fundamental objectives of tort law are
reconciled with society’s evolving sense of justice.238 The public
231. Id.
232. Id. at 867; Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549
(La. 1996).
233. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 868.
234. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2015); Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 866–68.
235. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 868. The Louisiana Supreme Court may have
simply deferred to the trial court’s discretion because the verdict form at the trial
court level had only allowed the jury to award one lump sum for lost chance. Id.
236. Id. at 868.
237. Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of Two
Cities, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 327, 329 (2010) (quoting W. Paige Keeton et al.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 3 at 15 (5th ed. 1984)).
238. “Accordingly, where tort law is no longer compatible with the realities or
attitudes of modern society or in keeping with the advances of science or
technology, adoption of a new rule or change in existing precedent has been found
to be warranted if otherwise consistent with tort principles.” Id. at 331–32.
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perception of justice is so important that courts have willingly bent
causation rules with the lost chance doctrine in order to satisfy it.239
Any progress with the lost chance of a better outcome doctrine must
similarly keep the fundamental purpose of tort law in mind.240 The lost
chance doctrine’s expansion ultimately resulted from society’s desire to
compensate plaintiffs in unique situations, even when they have not met
the traditional causation requirements.241 Judgments against physicians in
lost chance of a better outcome cases may provide a deterrence function;242
however, the MMA insulates physicians from liability, limiting any
deterrence functions that damage awards may have.243 Based on the nature
of the lost chance claim and the MMA’s strict regulation of medical
malpractice awards, damages for lost chance of a better outcome must
primarily serve to make the plaintiff whole rather than to deter the
physician.244
A. Deterrence of Negligent Treatment
A fundamental objective of tort law, particularly in professional
liability claims, is deterrence.245 As a result of increased potential for
liability, physicians may become more aware of liability risks and adjust
their practices accordingly.246 On the other hand, increasing liability
exposure of practitioners can put a strain on the health care system and, in
turn, increase medical costs.247 Commentators have debated whether the
threat of tort litigation truly is a deterrent on potential tortfeasors, such as
physicians.248 Notwithstanding issues in deterrence, other concerns may
arise when expanding a physician’s liability exposure.249 If physicians are
vulnerable to extensive liability in cases involving lost chance of a better
239. Saroyan, supra note 31, at 31.
240. See King, supra note 34, at 166.
241. See Saroyan, supra note 31, at 29.
242. See King, supra note 34, at 166.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Carney, supra note 32, at 358.
246. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 2, 56–57 (1990).
247. See discussion supra, Section I.D.; see also Carney, supra note 32, at 361.
248. See King, supra note 34, at 187–90 (offering a number of cognitive
psychology findings that raise doubts about tort law’s deterrent effect, the primary
reason being that punishment for torts does not immediately follow the tortious
conduct and therefore does not affect the deliberative cognitive processes of
potential defendants).
249. See id.
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outcome, they may be less willing to try and treat patients who fall below
the 50% chance threshold for fear that any failed treatment attempts will
result in litigation.250 Commentators have rejected this fear, arguing that
no evidence supports the idea that physicians will simply stop treating
patients.251 Furthermore, this argument is inconsistent with the application
of the lost chance of a better outcome doctrine because, in these cases, the
doctor does not know the full extent of the patient’s injury or illness at the
time of treatment.252
Alternatively, expanding doctors’ potential liability too much might
cause doctors to practice defensive medicine.253 Increased liability
exposure may force health care providers to “place the requirements of the
legal system before the needs and the finances of the patient.”254 Doctors
may perform unnecessary tests and be excessively thorough to protect
themselves from liability, which could potentially drive up Louisiana’s
health care costs.255 Increased medical malpractice premiums translating
to increased health care costs are the precise trend that the Louisiana
MMA’s limitation on recovery aimed to combat.256
Although commentators have heavily debated the policy concerns
with expanding physician liability, in reality, any intended deterrent effect
of medical malpractice judgments may be null because physicians have
medical malpractice insurance to bear the brunt of their mistakes.257
Louisiana’s health care and insurance systems, rather than defendant
physicians, have purportedly suffered from excessively high jury awards,
necessitating that the legislature adopt the MMA.258 The MMA also
affords physicians an extra layer of protection from liability because the
MMA requires a plaintiff to request a panel of doctors to review a claim
before the plaintiff can file suit, thereby creating another administrative
hurdle for each plaintiff.259 Further, a defendant physician’s liability is

250. Truckor, supra note 72, at 369.
251. Weigand, supra note 5, at 15.
252. Id.
253. Carney, supra note 32, at 361.
254. Perrochet, supra note 48, at 625.
255. Id. at 622.
256. Dekaris & Mims, supra note 173, at 39.
257. “[T]here is a disjunction between those who actually pay for tort liability
and those who actually engaged in the tortious conduct.” King, supra note 34, at
187–90.
258. Spearman, supra note 166, at 400; Nickel, supra note 165, at 315.
259. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) (2018). Failing to submit the claim
to a medical review panel subjects a medical malpractice plaintiff’s claim to an
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limited to $100,000; the Louisiana PCF pays any damages the plaintiff
proves in excess of this amount.260 Since legislation heavily insulates
defendant physicians from liability, the main purpose of awarding tort
damages in the particular context of medical malpractice must be to
adequately compensate the plaintiff.
B. Compensation and Corrective Justice
The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, as well as modern
commentators, have advanced the view that corrective justice is the
primary purpose of tort law.261 One of the fundamental goals of tort law is
to make plaintiffs whole for their losses.262 Courts may not compensate for
the full loss263 when a plaintiff started with a less-than-even chance of a
better outcome because the plaintiff cannot prove but-for causation;
however, the lost chance in and of itself still has a distinct compensable
value that deserves adequate redress.264 When a physician breaches a duty
to protect the plaintiff from certain harm, the average plaintiff would place
a high value on a less than 50% chance to avoid that harm.265
Compensating for this kind of loss is important because a plaintiff’s lost
chance of a better outcome could greatly alter the course of her life, as the
facts of Burchfield show.266
exception of prematurity. William E. Crawford, 12 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, TORT
LAW § 15:5 (2d ed.) (Nov. 2018).
260. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(2) (2015); see also Louisiana Patient’s
Compensation Fund, LA. DIV. OF ADMIN., https://www.doa.la.gov/Pages/pcf
/Index.aspx [https://perma.cc/9SVX-54DF] (“The vast majority of health care
providers are enrolled in the Patient’s Compensation Fund and pay surcharges for
the coverage and protection provided. The Patient’s Compensation Fund provides
protection for the healthcare system, keeping costs down, and providing a
guaranteed pool of funds to pay those citizens injured from medical malpractice
of private health care providers.”) (last visited Dec. 24, 2019).
261. Saroyan, supra note 31, at 30; Fischer, supra note 37, at 627.
262. Kalven, supra note 31, at 158.
263. “Full loss” means full wrongful death and survival damages in a lost
chance of survival case, or full damages for the resulting injury in a lost chance
of a better outcome case. See Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So.
2d 543, 548 (La. 1996) (“To allow full recovery would ignore the claimants’
inability to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the malpractice victim
would have survived but for the malpractice, which is a requirement for full
recovery.”).
264. See id.; Fischer, supra note 37, at 624; Jansen, supra note 67, at 271.
265. Fischer, supra note 37, at 611.
266. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 868 (La. 2018).
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The corrective justice principle provides that courts should “restore
equality” amongst tortfeasors and their victims by penalizing the tortfeasor
and returning to the victim what he has lost.267 Moreover, corrective justice
only restores a victim to the extent that the defendant caused the harm: “in
order to allow corrective justice its appropriate workings, damages paid
must be equal to damages caused. It is at this point which corrective justice
and deterrence are inextricably linked.”268
An act gives rise to liability only to the extent that it causes an injury;
thus, a physician should not be liable for more than the extent to which he
caused or aggravated a patient’s injury.269 Courts must evenly balance
corrective justice and compensation in medical malpractice—awarding
damages must not shift the balance too far in the plaintiff’s favor and
unjustly penalize physicians, creating over-deterrence.270
IV. COMPLICATIONS FROM LOUISIANA’S CURRENT LOST CHANCE
APPROACH
The Burchfield opinion poses several problems for lost chance
plaintiffs. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not conduct thorough
analysis of the lost chance of a better outcome and failed to meaningfully
distinguish the nature of the claim from that of lost chance of survival.271
Second, the opinion simply defers to Smith without contemplating the
implications that the lump sum method might have on lost chance of a
better outcome plaintiffs.272 Third, this lack of analysis also raises policy
issues concerning fundamental fairness to the plaintiff: Louisiana
jurisprudence has held that tort law is intended to make a victim whole,
but Burchfield, by holding that medical expenses are not recoverable, fails
to do so.273 Further, the reasoning of Burchfield, which simply lumps
medical expenses together with the rest of lost chance damages, is
inadequate in cases where a plaintiff’s deserved medical expenses exceed
the $500,000 limit.274

267. Saroyan, supra note 31, at 31.
268. Id.
269. Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1338.
270. See Saroyan, supra note 31, at 31.
271. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 866–68.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 868.
274. Id. at 867; Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547
(La. 1996); Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1216–17 (La. 1994).
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A. Burchfield’s Deference to Smith’s Lump Sum Approach Lacks Nuance
In Burchfield, the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the Second
Circuit’s decision because the court “misapplied [the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s] settled jurisprudence on the determination of damages in a lost
chance of a better outcome case.”275 The settled jurisprudence to which the
Burchfield Court refers includes Graham, Smith, and Hargroder v.
Unkel.276
In Smith, the Louisiana Supreme Court settled on a method for
calculating damages in a lost chance of survival claim.277 Smith adopted
the method of allowing the jury to consider all evidence of the lost chance
claim and subjectively value the chance lost as an item of general
damages.278 The Court reasoned that because the lost chance of survival is
subjective in nature, a subjective valuation method is required.279 There
was a gap in the Smith Court’s analysis because it did not contemplate the
possibility that a lost chance plaintiff may recover special medical
damages, which are exempt from the MMA cap.280 Smith’s logic worked
under the facts of that case, as medical expenses were evidently not at issue
and therefore the facts did not implicate the medical care exception to the
cap.281 The previously dormant gap in Smith’s reasoning, however, came
to light in Burchfield over 20 years later. Unlike Smith, Burchfield’s facts
involved a great deal of medical expenses and the implication of the
MMA’s cap.282 Nonetheless, the Burchfield Court simply deferred to
Smith, and the gap in Smith’s logic became baked into the Burchfield
opinion.283 As a result, the Burchfield opinion yields results contrary to the
MMA’s legislative intent: it prevents recovery of future medical bills in a
statutory malpractice action.284
275. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 862.
276. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 543; Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So.
2d 365 (La. 1997); Hargroder v. Unkel, 888 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004).
277. See generally Smith, 676 So. 2d at 543.
278. Id. at 547.
279. Id.
280. Notably, it appears that the plaintiffs in Smith did not seek medical
expenses. This could explain the Smith Court’s lack of analysis regarding this
aspect of damages. See generally Smith, 676 So. 2d at 543; See Plaintiff’s Petition
for Damages, Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 1991 WL 11689464 (La.
Dist. Ct. June 19, 1991).
281. See generally Smith, 676 So. 2d at 543.
282. See generally Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
283. Id. at 866.
284. Id. at 863–64, 868; LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2 (2015); Smith, 676 So.
2d at 543.
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Graham, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s first lost chance of a better
outcome case, adhered to the Smith method, but without justification other
than the fact that Smith also involved a lost chance of some form.285 Like
the Smith Court, the Graham Court did not distinguish between general
and special damages.286 The Graham Court simply employed the Smith
lump sum method, examining the evidence surrounding the injury and
putting a number value on the chance lost.287 Even though Graham first
recognized lost chance of a better outcome in Louisiana, the discussion in
Graham focused more closely on the issue of whether a physician’s
settlement admitted liability, rather than damages, and as a result, the court
conducted minimal analysis of the lost chance doctrine.288 The Louisiana
Second Circuit in Hargroder followed suit, employing the Smith method
to calculate damages for a patient whose doctor failed to timely diagnose
and treat the patient’s stoke, causing him to suffer a lost chance of a better
outcome.289 The Hargroder opinion made no distinction between medical
expenses and general damages awarded for a lost chance.290
Similar to Graham and Hargroder, the Burchfield Court simply
deferred to the lump sum approach without any scrutiny or examination of
policy and related laws, such as the MMA—and in particular, the MMA’s
explicit provision for uncapped medical expenses.291 In adhering to an old
precedent, the Burchfield Court gave little justification for strictly
following the Smith approach, other than the fact that Graham and
Hargroder had also cited to Smith to guide their lost chance of a better
outcome awards.292 None of these opinions distinguished between the
general damage—the lost chance itself—and the special damage of
medical expenses that a plaintiff incurs along with her lost chance.293 The
285. Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 699 So. 2d 365 (La. 1997).
286. See generally id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Hargroder v. Unkel, 888 So. 2d 953, 957–58 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004),
followed the same pattern as Graham by relying on Smith for guidance on
calculating damages.
290. Id. at 960–61.
291. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2 (2015).
292. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 864 (La. 2018).
293. Several commentators have recognized that medical expenses should be
available to the plaintiffs in lost chance cases and need not be reduced in all cases.
DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 196 (2d ed. Westlaw 2018 Update).
Richard E. Kaye, Damages for Loss of Chance of Cure, 154 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3d 273, § 9 (Westlaw Mar. 2019 Update); Fischer, supra note 37, at 620;
Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1355. See also King, supra note 34, at 165 (arguing
that future medical expenses for rehabilitation and compensation for loss of
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difference between the two kinds of damages warrants a nuanced approach
to awarding lost chance damages.294 Further, the commingling of the
speculative lost chance injury and objectively determinable medical
expenses leads to an award that few appellate courts will be able to
properly review.295
B. Lack of an Easily Reviewable Award
Aside from the lack of necessary analysis, the Burchfield Court
additionally erred by approving a trial court verdict form that did not
require the jury to enumerate what damages it awarded.296 The Smith Court
reasoned that appellate courts could test the accuracy of the jury’s lump
sum award by examining evidence in the record.297 As one commentator
pointed out, however, general damage awards are practically unreviewable
when juries do not have to identify the specific damages that are awarded
on the verdict form.298 The jury’s $680,000 award for Burchfield’s lost
chance of a better outcome was a lump sum.299 The jury did not have to
find the percentage of fault of the doctor, nor did the form require the jury
to specify an amount for past medicals, lost wages, loss of consortium, or
future medicals.300 The award in Burchfield was likely difficult to review
because the Louisiana Supreme Court could not have discerned what
portion of the $680,000 trial court award constituted either special or
general damages.301 Thus, without more specific information, the

earning capacity truly return a plaintiff to his pre-accident state, while general
damages for pain and suffering cannot make a plaintiff whole).
294. See King, supra note 34, at 165.
295. See Carney, supra note 32, at 365.
296. The plaintiff’s attorneys evidently did not ask for these lines on the
verdict form. The plaintiffs did, however, argue that the trial court’s jury charges
“did not comport” with the Supreme Court’s preferred civil jury charges.
Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 861.
297. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
Burchfield also cited this safeguard against speculative verdicts approvingly.
Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 867.
298. Carney, supra note 32, at 365; see also Burchfield, 224 So. 3d at 1175
(holding that the verdict form was flawed as a matter of law because the lump
sum method did not reflect the specific damages that the jury intended to award).
299. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 858.
300. Id. at 868.
301. Id. at 859–60.
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Burchfield Court lacked a good foundation for analysis.302 As a result, the
Court simply subjected the entire lump sum to the MMA damage cap.303
When two fundamentally different remedies are intertwined, an
appellate court cannot properly review medical expense awards.304
Medical expenses have become blurred with general damages in a manner
detrimental to lost chance plaintiffs, even though medical expenses are
special damages that compensate for a different aspect of a plaintiff’s
injury.305 The Burchfield holding’s future implications will deny much
needed compensation to severely injured plaintiffs whose damages exceed
the cap.306 Further, the holding contravenes Louisiana jurisprudence, the
legislative intent to provide medical relief to these severely injured
plaintiffs, and the primary objective of tort law of making the plaintiff
whole.307
C. Fundamental Fairness Issues the Burchfield Opinion Poses
Aside from its deficiencies in analysis, the Burchfield opinion also
raises issues of fundamental fairness to victims of lost chances.308 It is
well-settled in Louisiana jurisprudence that a tortfeasor “takes his victim
as he finds him” and is thus accountable for all “natural and probable
consequences” of his actions.309 As a general rule, Louisiana courts have
held that “[w]hen a defendant’s tortious conduct aggravates a pre-existing
condition, the defendant must compensate the victim to the full extent of
the aggravation.”310 As the Burchfield case illustrates, Louisiana’s
approach to lost chance fails to adequately compensate lost chance
plaintiffs in the “severely injured” category—those whose damages
302. Id.
303. Id. at 867.
304. See Carney, supra note 32, at 365.
305. See Antley v. Rodgers, 251 So. 3d 607, 624 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2018);
Urquhart v. Spencer, 224 So. 3d 1022, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017); Boutte
v. Hargrove, 290 So. 2d 319, 322 (La. 1974).
306. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2 (2015); see also Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic,
85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012).
307. Kalven, supra note 31, at 158.
308. See generally Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855.
309. Urquhart, 224 So. 3d at 1031; Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1005
(La. 1993).
310. Urquhart, 224 So. 3d at 1031 (quoting Lasha, 625 So. 2d at 1005). It
should be noted, however, that not every lost chance of a better outcome case
necessarily involves an “aggravation” in the sense that an “aggravation” occurred
in Lasha.
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exceed the cap.311 The evidence put on at the trial court level showed that
the plaintiff would have to pay $1,718.78 for medication every month—a
medical expense directly related to his heart transplant.312 Further, the
plaintiff could not return to his job, and evidence showed that he would
lose future wages totaling $493,020.313 The incident left the plaintiff
unable to work and unable to pay for his past medical bills and the future
expenses he would incur for the continued monitoring of his condition.314
Despite this drastic change in financial position after the incident, the
plaintiff only recovered $500,000.315
Preventing recovery of future medical bills does not compensate a
plaintiff “to the full extent of the aggravation” because the defendant’s
negligence may have caused a large portion, if not all, of a plaintiff’s
medical bills.316 Although a plaintiff might have eventually incurred
expenses to treat a pre-existing condition anyway, the defendant could
have caused a plaintiff to incur more medical expenses than she otherwise
would have by aggravating a pre-existing condition or failing to diagnose
a condition.317 Further, as Joseph H. King, Jr., argued, general damages—
such as pain and suffering—will not actually restore injured plaintiffs to
their pre-injury states.318 Rather, King asserted that economic damages,
such as future medical expenses, can genuinely ease a plaintiff’s pain by
funding treatment of the plaintiff’s poor condition.319
Aside from releasing a defendant physician from a portion of tort
liability, the Burchfield holding fails to satisfy the compensatory objective
of tort law because it does not allow plaintiffs to recover medical expenses
outside of the MMA’s cap on damages.320 A judge or jury in the factfinding role can distinguish medical expenses that a plaintiff would have
paid to treat her pre-existing condition, regardless of the negligence, from
311. See generally Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855; Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d
1210, 1216–17 (La. 1994).
312. Burchfield v. Wright, 224 So. 3d 1170, 1176 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 868.
316. Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1006 (La. 1993).
317. “The fact that there was a likelihood that future treatments would have
been required even absent any malpractice should not preclude recovery of a
portion of the future medical expenses.” Kaye, supra note 293.
318. “The only damages that realistically can be said to contribute to the return
of the plaintiff to his pre-injury state are economic damages that address loss of
earning capacity and medical expenses.” King, supra note 34, at 165.
319. Id.
320. Lasha, 625 So. 2d at 1006; Kalven, supra note 31, at 158.
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those expenses caused by the malpractice.321 Thus, a method separating
the medical expense calculation from the general damage calculation
could remedy the issues that Burchfield brought to light.322
V. RECOVERY: SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM BURCHFIELD PRESENTS IN
LOUISIANA
By ruling that the lump sum method alone should govern lost chance
of a better outcome damages, Burchfield did not adequately analyze the
lost chance of a better outcome claim.323 Since a lost chance claim is a
“statutory malpractice action,” the MMA damage cap should not apply to
medical damages in a lost chance case, and plaintiffs should benefit from
the exception that the Louisiana Legislature implemented in 1984.324
Burchfield also sheds light on the nature of lost chance of survival
remedies—for the same reasons, lost chance of survival plaintiffs should
also benefit from the “future medical care and related benefits” exception
of the MMA.325 Procedural changes in adjudicating lost chance claims,
particularly at the phase in the trial when the fact-finder calculates
damages, could remedy the problem Burchfield presents. The proper
solution to this problem ultimately calls for a mandatory separation
between the award of medical damages and general damages, and several
approaches can implement this method into Louisiana’s lost chance
doctrine.
A. The Subjective Lump Sum Method Alone Should Not Apply to Lost
Chance
Lost chance of a better outcome plaintiffs survive their illnesses, but
they go on to live with diminished quality and additional burdens, such as
expensive medical treatments and the impaired capability to work.326
Louisiana courts, therefore, should allow all lost chance plaintiffs to
recover medical bills as a separate damage from the jury’s general lump
sum award. Courts should still allow juries to use the lump sum approach
in awarding general damages for the lost chance itself, which would
include emotional distress from the advancement of a condition, pain and

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
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Burchfield, 275 So. 3d 855.
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Id.
King, supra note 34, at 165.
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suffering, a decreased life expectancy, and loss of consortium.327
Additionally, although future medical expenses are exclusive to the lost
chance of a better outcome claim, lost chance of survival plaintiffs may
have a claim to past medicals, which the courts must also award separate
from the lump sum.328 By dividing the damage inquiry, courts can ensure
that medical expenses are not capped.329 If these medical expenses are no
longer confined to the lump sum, courts can more readily review their
accuracy.330
B. The Medical Malpractice Cap Should Not Limit Lost Chance
Plaintiffs’ Recovery of Future Medical Expenses
In holding that the plaintiff could not recover any future medical
expenses for lost chance of a better outcome, the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s opinion in Burchfield diverged from the MMA’s intent to allow
administrative recovery of medical expenses.331 The MMA’s cap on
damages implicitly discriminated against severely injured plaintiffs
because it limited recovery on the basis of physical condition.332 The intent
behind the “future medical care” exception of the MMA was to provide
additional compensation for those who fell within that class because their
damages exceeded the cap.333 Rather than raising the cap, the legislature
added the exception to remedy the cap’s drastic effects.334
The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that the MMA must be
“strictly construed” because it is special legislation that grants
“immunities or advantages” to certain classes—that is, qualified health
care providers—and inherently restricts the rights typically available to
tort victims.335 The language of the MMA provides that in all malpractice
327. Kaye, supra note 293.
328. See, e.g., Greer v. Lammico, 779 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2000);
see also Kaye, supra note 293.
329. See discussion supra note 293.
330. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
331. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
332. Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. 1994).
333. Id. at 1216–17.
334. Id. The language of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 40:1231.2(B)(1) is as
follows: “The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to
or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as
provided in R.S. 40:1231.3, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus
interest and costs.”
335. Kelty, 633 So. 2d at 1216 (citing Galloway v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp.,
602 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (La. 1992)). See also Romero v. Elias, 972 So. 2d 450 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2007).
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claims filed with the board336 that proceed to jury trial, the court must give
the jury a special interrogatory asking whether the patient is in need of
future medical care and related benefits.337 Further, the language requires
that in a bench trial, the trial court’s finding “shall include a recitation that
the patient is or is not in need of future medical care and related
benefits.”338 The plain language of the future medical care exception, read
in pari materia339 with the MMA’s two provisions that mandate a special
jury interrogatory or a specific trial court recitation for all malpractice
claims, indicates that the legislature intended the medical expense
exception to apply to all statutory malpractice claims.340
The well-settled jurisprudence cited in Burchfield states that the lost
chance claim is not a “separate cause of action”—rather, lost chance is a
theory of recovery that one may assert in a statutory malpractice claim.341
The Burchfield Court clearly conceived of lost chance of a better outcome
as a standard malpractice claim; the only distinguishing factor of lost
chance is the kind of injury the plaintiff incurs.342 If the Louisiana Supreme
336. The “board” to which this provision refers is the Patient’s Compensation
Fund Oversight Board. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1(A)(3) (2015).
337. Id. § 40:1231.3(A)(1) (“In all malpractice claims filed with the board which
proceed to trial, the jury shall be given a special interrogatory asking if the patient is
in need of future medical care and related benefits that will be incurred after the date
of the response to the special interrogatory, and the amount thereof.”).

338. Id. § 40:1231.3(A)(2) (emphasis added). The provision also contemplates
that the court should include a specific amount in this recitation. Id. But see
Lamark v. NME Hosps., Inc., 522 So. 2d 634 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a trial court need not specify an amount in the initial recitation where the
amount is not in dispute).
339. In pari materia is a civilian method of interpretation providing that laws
on the same subject matter should be interpreted in light of one another. ALAIN A.
LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW AND METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION 94 (2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 (2019) (“Laws on the
same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.”).
340. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1231.2(B)(1), 40:1231.3(A)(1)–(2).
341. “The loss of a chance of a better outcome is a theory of recovery . . . It is
not a separate cause of action distinct from a statutory malpractice claim.”
Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 863 (citing Bailey v. Knatt, 207 So. 3d 407 (La. 2016)).
342. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 863 (La. 2018); see also Lewis v.
Cornerstone Hosp. of Bossier City, LLC, 280 So. 3d 1262 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2019). In Lewis, the Louisiana Second Circuit approvingly cited Burchfield’s
proposition that the lost chance of a better outcome claim operates as a statutory
malpractice claim. Lewis, 280 So. 3d at 1271. As such, the court required the
plaintiff to prove duty, breach, and “substantial factor” causation under the
medical malpractice burden of proof statute. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. §

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 250

4/15/20 8:48 AM

2020]

COMMENT

529

Court treats lost chance cases as statutory malpractice actions while giving
the MMA a strict construction, it should follow that the “future medical”
exception to the MMA cap should also apply in the lost chance claim. 343
As such, lost chance plaintiffs should recover all medical expenses
incurred following the malpractice.
When a plaintiff has a pre-existing condition, some future harm
incurred may be attributed to that pre-existing condition.344 A defendant
physician, however, should not be liable for more than his proportion of
fault.345 A possible objection to awarding future medical expenses to lost
chance of a better outcome plaintiffs may be that it is unreasonable to
award a plaintiff future medical bills for the rest of her life when she cannot
prove that a defendant physician’s mistake was the cause of all medical
bills incurred. Awarding high quantities of medical expenses could strain
the PCF, much like excessive jury awards strained the insurance system.346
Further, injuries that the plaintiff incurred from the alleged malpractice
may dissipate in the future, and future medicals would over-compensate
plaintiffs in that instance.347 The MMA’s provisions, however, have
already addressed these concerns.348
The MMA established the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight
Board (PCFOB), which is responsible for the management, operation, and
defense of the fund.349 Another provision in the MMA requires the PCFOB
to meet annually to discuss new rates the PCF will charge health care
providers, and this provision also requires the PCFOB to ensure the fund
remains actuarially sound.350 The legislature also built a number of
administrative checks into the MMA that help avoid economic strain on
the PCF.
First, the PCF pays future medical damages “as incurred and presented
for payment,” rather than in a lump sum at the time of initial judgment.351
This provision avoids unnecessarily over-compensating a plaintiff.352 For
example, a patient receiving PCF payments may later die from her injuries,
9:2794(A)). Ultimately, the Second Circuit found evidence that the physician did
not breach, so the court did not reach the issue of lost chance damages. Id.
343. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2.
344. See King, supra note 5, at 1360.
345. Id.
346. See Carney, supra note 32, at 361; Fish, supra note 162, at 137.
347. Weigand, supra note 5, at 15.
348. See, e.g., LA REV. STAT. § 40:1231.3(G).
349. Id. § 40:1231.4(D)(1)(a)–(2)(a).
350. Id. § 40:1231.4(A)(2)(a)–(g).
351. Id. § 40:1231.3(A)(4).
352. See Levin, supra note 182, at 973.
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and this provision would prevent a family member from obtaining a
windfall if there are leftover funds.353 Second, the PCF is entitled to have
a physician examine a patient from time to time to ensure that the patient
is in continued need of future medical care.354 Third, the MMA has
provisions that prevent the fund from being exhausted entirely: for
example, the MMA provides that the PCF may make prorated payments
when a full payment of all final claims would exhaust the fund.355 Since
the MMA ensures PCF payouts are limited to only those that are truly
necessary, breaking down plaintiffs’ barriers to recovering medical
expenses in lost chance cases will not unduly burden the PCF.356
C. Lost Chance of Survival Plaintiffs Should Recover Past Medical
Expenses
If the MMA’s exception to the damages cap, including “future medical
care and related benefits,” applies to lost chance of a better outcome
medical expenses, it should also apply to any medical expenses potentially
recoverable in a lost chance of survival claim.357 Even though it is
important to compensate lost chance of a better outcome plaintiffs, who
will likely need medical care long after litigation, courts must also ensure
that lost chance of survival plaintiffs receive just compensation.358 The
Smith plaintiffs did not request medical expenses,359 which explains why
the Smith Court did not say whether a lost chance plaintiff could recover
separate medical expenses or whether medical expenses are contained in
the jury’s lump sum award.360
A number of Louisiana lost chance of survival cases have involved
explicit requests for past medical expenses.361 Because the MMA provides
that medical expenses in a malpractice action are not capped, Louisiana
courts must allow past medical expenses as a separate damage in lost
353. Id.
354. LA REV. STAT. § 40:1231.3(G).
355. Id. § 40:1231.3(A)(7)(a).
356. For more discussion on the PCF and the process of paying out future
medical expenses, see Levin, supra note 182.
357. Fischer, supra note 37, at 620.
358. See generally Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543,
549 (La. 1996).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Guilbeau v. Bayou Chateau Nursing Ctr., 930 So. 2d 1167 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006); Greer v. Lammico, 779 So. 2d 894 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
2000).
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chance of survival cases as well.362 The reliability in calculating medical
expenses warrants an assessment separate from the subjective injury of the
actual loss of chance; further, the medical expenses arise from the lost
chance, but they are not the lost chance injury in and of themselves.363
When medical expenses are at issue in lost chance cases, requiring the trial
court or jury to render a separate finding of medical expenses will solve
this problem for both lost chance of a better outcome claims and lost
chance of survival claims. This solution will be easy to implement and will
account for the needs of all lost chance plaintiffs.
D. Implementing a Solution: Louisiana Should Require Separation of
Medical Damages and General Damages in Awarding Lost Chance
Damages
Louisiana must adopt a method of determining lost chance damages
that accounts for the MMA’s express provision that medical expenses are
exempt from the damage cap.364 As a solution, trial courts could simply
require the fact-finder to employ discretion and make a special finding of
medical expenses when parties litigate a lost chance. Under this approach,
a jury verdict form would require a medical expense calculation separate
from the lost chance inquiry.365 Similarly, in a bench trial, a judge must
make specific findings of medical expenses.366 Separating the two
calculations would eliminate any risk that the medical expenses would be
lumped in with the general damages, and it would avoid situations like
Burchfield in which an appellate court is unable to adequately review
awards for specific damages because they are all encompassed in one
amount.367
At trial, the court would allow a medical expert to testify to the
approximate amount of past medical expenses incurred and whether the
plaintiff will require future medical care.368 If a judge allows lost chance

362. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1)(a) (2015).
363. See Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1350–51.
364. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.3(G) (2018).
365. LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. art. 1812(C)(4) (1983).
366. Id. art. 1917(B) (1980).
367. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 868 (La. 2018).
368. Although an expert physician can attest to the need of medical damages,
the Fourth Circuit has held an expert is not necessary. Cooper v. Bouchard
Transp., 130 So. 3d 1, 6–7 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2013). Rather, a plaintiff can
prove the amount of future medical expenses “through the testimony of an expert
in vocational rehabilitation counseling and life care planning, paired with
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as a remedy, the jury should have the opportunity to award the medical
expenses on a line separate from the general damages. The court would
carefully instruct the jury to award only medical expenses that a plaintiff
incurred as a result of the physician’s negligence.369 Essentially, the jury
will use its discretion to isolate the medical expenses that resulted from
the defendant’s breach and only award medical expenses in that amount.
The following provides an example of an ideal verdict form:370
We, the jury, present the following answers to the questions
submitted by the court:
1. Do you find ________ was denied a chance of a [better
outcome/survival] due to the fault of the defendant? Yes _____
No _____
[If answered yes to question 1, proceed to question 2.]
2. Without considering your answers under any of the above
questions, proceed to determine the damages sustained by
________.
Loss of Chance Damages: ________
Medical Expenses to Date: ________
Future Medical Expenses: ________
Using the lump sum method from Smith, the jury would still determine
the speculative value of the lost chance under “Loss of Chance Damages,”
considering evidence of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, emotional
distress, disability and disfigurement, and loss of consortium, as Smith
directed.371 The verdict form, as well as the trial court’s jury instructions,
must clearly explain to the jury that it should not consider medical

testimony of a forensic accountant to calculate the present value of the medical
expenses.” Dekaris & Mims, supra note 173, at 886–87.
369. Kaye, supra note 293.
370. These jury instructions are modeled off of PATTERN INST. KAN. CIVIL
181.06.
371. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
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expenses when awarding the lump sum lost chance damages.372 As a result,
the plaintiff would potentially receive a lump sum award for general
damages, which the court will then reduce pursuant to the MMA’s damage
cap.373 The plaintiff may also receive medical expenses, not subject to the
MMA’s cap.374
In ideal circumstances, the Louisiana Supreme Court would reverse or
modify its ruling in Burchfield to reflect legislative intent. The more
expedient route, however, will be a legislative amendment. To implement
this solution, the Louisiana Legislature should amend the MMA to require
specific jury interrogatories when lost chance is at issue.375 Additionally,
the provision should direct a judge to make the same findings of medical
expenses—both past and future—in a bench trial.376 Article 1812 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure addresses the trial court’s general duty
to submit special verdict forms to the jury.377 The article does not mandate
a special verdict form; a judge only submits a special verdict form if
requested by the parties.378 Since the MMA already establishes procedures
in medical malpractice actions that diverge from article 1812’s general
372. Well-crafted and clear jury instructions can assist the fact-finder in
awarding damages more consistent with the injury at issue. See Aagaard, supra
note 138, at 1350–51.
373. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2 (2015).
374. Id.
375. This revision would ideally occur within a subsection of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 40:1231.3(A), which addresses the procedure in determining
“future medical care and related benefits.” Specifically, subsection (A)(6) states
that the provisions requiring a special finding of future medical care apply to “all
malpractice claims.” The legislature could amend subsection (A)(6) to state that
these procedural requirements apply to “all malpractice claims, regardless of the
plaintiff’s theory of recovery.” This substantive change would allow lost chance
plaintiffs to receive the full benefit of the future medical care exception that the
MMA already provides. Although the amended subsection would conflict with
the Burchfield holding, a number of other states have developed legislation to
address their supreme courts’ rulings on the lost chance doctrine. See Guest et al.,
supra note 62, at 104–07.
376. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.3(A) (2015).
377. LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. art. 1812 (1983). Subsection (C)(4) requires that at
the request of any party, the court shall submit jury instructions inquiring as to the
total amount of special damages and general damages resulting from the loss. A
potential legislative amendment to the MMA could ensure that courts submit a
special interrogatory in lost chance cases, regardless of whether a party requests
such an instruction.
378. Id. art. 1812(C) (1983). Generally, a trial judge has broad discretion to
fashion jury charges and verdict forms. Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 983 So. 2d 798,
804 (La. 2008).
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rule, the MMA is the most appropriate place to effect change in trial court
procedure.379
Requiring the judge to submit a special verdict form for lost chance
would still allow the jury to make the pertinent fact-finding determinations,
therefore raising the least due process concerns by safeguarding the
fact-finder’s role in the trial process.380 Further, this approach adequately
compensates severely injured plaintiffs by allowing recovery of at least
some medical expenses, just as the legislature’s 1984 amendment to the
MMA intended.381 Separating medical expenses and general damages will
also ensure that damage awards do not grow excessively high and strain the
health care system: the MMA damage cap serves as a check on general
damages, while the fact-finder’s discretionary role serves as a check on
medical damages.
Requiring an itemized verdict form is the appropriate way for a jury
to award lost chance damages because the form accounts for the special
nature of the lost chance of a better outcome claim.382 Further, this remedy
would be fairly easy to implement for both types of lost chance claims.
Louisiana courts will not adopt this method of their own volition, as they
have continued to require an undivided lump sum award at the trial court
level.383 Thus, the legislature can mandate special findings of medical
expenses at the trial court level with a simple amendment to the MMA.
Administration of this remedy would be straightforward—the judiciary
could easily modify the jury charges and verdict forms it uses in lost
chance cases. The special verdict form approach is superior to the
following solutions: (1) the pure lump sum approach that the Louisiana
Supreme Court currently uses; and (2) the percentage probability approach
379. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.3(A) (2015). Unlike Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1812, the MMA states that “the jury shall be given a special
interrogatory” regardless of whether a party requests it. Id. § 40:1231.3(A)(1)
(emphasis added).
380. Pitts v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 218 So. 3d 58, 66 (La. 2017) (in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the “great deference
given to the jury in its fact-finding role”).
381. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1); Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210,
1217 (La. 1994).
382. Here, the lost chance of a better outcome claim is “special” insofar as it
may require the award of future medical expenses.
383. See, e.g., Malbrough v. Rodgers, 2020 WL 466025 at *1 (La. Ct. App.
3d.Cir. Jan. 29, 2020). Although the amount awarded in Malbrough did not
involve medical expenses, it demonstrates the courts’ reluctance to deviate from
the Smith framework. One would expect this result, given the Burchfield Court’s
express disapproval of awarding special damages separate from the lump sum in
lost chance cases.
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for which King advocated.384 The itemized verdict form, with the
fact-finder’s discretion, ensures reviewability of awards, most fairly
compensates plaintiffs and deters defendants, and creates a system in
which the award bears the closest possible nexus to the injury.385
1. General “Lump Sum” Damages as Provided in Smith: Too
General
Retaining the “lump sum” method from Smith for lost chance of a
better outcome claims would allow the jury to look at all of the evidence
of a lost chance of a better outcome claim and assign a number to it.386 The
lump sum method has the greatest potential for inaccurate and skewed
results.387 Due to the emotional nature of some lost chance of a better
outcome damages, a jury may tend to overvalue a small lost chance.388
When a physician causes the very harm from which a doctor is expected
to protect a patient, a jury may construe this tortious conduct as “betrayal,”
and the stronger emotional response will likely lead to a higher jury
award.389 The lump sum approach gives juries more leeway to express bias
and make errors.390
Further, where a jury award does not separate medical expenses from
lump sum damages, appellate courts would be virtually unable to review
the amount of medical expenses at issue in lost chance judgments.391 The
standard for appellate review gives little guidance on assessing awards,
and with a general damage award, there is little justification for
overturning or adjusting a jury’s award.392 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s
adoption of the lump sum approach in Burchfield shows how this method
can fall short of tort law’s objectives.393 Used alone, the lump sum method
for calculating lost chance damages creates obvious inequities because it
384. King, supra note 5, at 1363–64.
385. “In sum, the discretionary valuation approach exhibits a closer
conceptual nexus to the compensable tort injury in a lost chance case than do
either the full damages approach or the proportional valuation approach.”
Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1353.
386. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
387. Carney, supra note 32, at 361.
388. Id.
389. Boaz Shnoor, Loss of Chance: A Behavioral Analysis of the Difference
Between Medical Negligence and Toxic Torts, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 71, 74
(2009).
390. See Carney, supra note 32, at 361.
391. Id.
392. Claudet v. Weyrich, 662 So. 2d 131, 134 (La Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
393. See generally Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
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deprives plaintiffs of medical bills in excess of the $500,000 cap and
leaves them without adequate means to truly recover from their injuries.
Similarly, a percentage probability approach is inadequate because it fails
to account for the unique nature of lost chance damages.
2. Percentage Probability Damages: Not Proportional Enough
The percentage probability method, for which King advocated in his
article, would allow a jury to find full damages for whatever injury that
occurred, then reduce those damages by the percentage of chance lost due
to the defendant physician’s negligence.394 If the trial court in Burchfield
had used this method, the jury would have first put a number on
Burchfield’s ultimate harm: the heart transplant.395 Imagine,
hypothetically, that the jury valued Burchfield’s ultimate physical injury
at $1,500,000. Then, the jury would have calculated the actual chance he
lost. If the jury decided that he lost a 30% chance of a better outcome, he
would have recovered $450,000.396 Other states have employed this
method because it is the most administratively sound and because it tends
to create more consistent jury awards than the lump sum approach.397 The
percentage probability method also creates a record of the jury’s process
of awarding damages, allowing an appellate court to more accurately
review the award later on.398 Some commentators have argued that this
approach most accurately compensates plaintiffs for their losses.399 Others
still doubt the accuracy of expert-provided percentage estimates and argue
that a court’s reliance on hired experts makes valuing the chance an
inherently imprecise process.400 For Louisiana, the primary countervailing
policy concern is judicial economy.401 As the Louisiana Supreme Court
pointed out in Smith, it appears arbitrary to have the jury come up with a
hypothetical number and then reduce it by a another imprecise percentage:
it’s extra, unnecessary work.402

394. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996);
King, supra note 5, at 1363–64.
395. See Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 859.
396. Perrochet, supra note 48, at 620. The calculation would go as follows:
$1,500,000 (cost of ultimate injury) x .30 (percent chance lost) = $450,000.
397. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986).
398. Carney, supra note 32, at 363.
399. Truckor, supra note 72, at 365.
400. Spearman, supra note 166, at 401.
401. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 (La. 1996).
402. Id.
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Further, although the verdict form approach provides a method that
targets only the actual compensable injuries a plaintiff incurs, the percentage
probability method tends to overcompensate or undercompensate.403 Simply
reducing the total damages by a percentage does not always reflect what
expenses a plaintiff actually incurs as a result of the negligence.404 As one
commentator pointed out, the percentage probability method is
unnecessarily rigid: no one formula should govern the calculation
exclusively.405 Awarding tort damages is a fact-intensive inquiry, and a jury
with a wide array of backgrounds can more accurately quantify lost chance
damages.406 This flexibility is important particularly for awarding medical
expenses.
Now imagine a man who suffered a late diagnosis of a heart
condition.407 Without the late diagnosis, the man would have potentially
paid the average cost of $135,000 for coronary bypass surgery408 and
continued monitoring and medication in the amount of $7,000 per year.409
Now, however, because the doctor failed to diagnose his condition, he had
403. See Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1353.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1355.
406. Id.
The discretionary method avoids the imposition of a legal rule on what
is a purely factual determination and thus allows for individualized
damage determinations that accurately reflect the loss that a particular
lost chance plaintiff suffers. By contrast, the proportional valuation
method applies a fixed mathematical formula to all assessments of lost
chance injuries, inappropriately imposing a legal principle on a factual
issue, and thus encroaches upon the rightful domain of the jury.
Id.
407. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Burchfield, but the
numbers are rounded in order to more readily demonstrate the difference between
the discretionary and percentage probability methods. See Burchfield v. Wright,
275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
408. A coronary bypass surgery can cost between $70,000 and $200,000.
Heart Bypass Surgery Cost, COSTHELPER, https://health.costhelper.com/
bypass.html [https://perma.cc/KG86-C96W] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). It should
be noted, however, that the surgery cost could vary widely depending on the
region, facility, and level of complication. See Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery
Costs and How to Pay for Them, LENDING POINT (Feb. 7, 2018), https://
www.lendingpoint.com/blog/coronary-bypass-what-it-costs-and-how-to-pay-for
-it/ [https://perma.cc/2SZK-7GZK].
409. Costs of post-operative care for a coronary bypass surgery may include
costs for physical therapy, blood-thinning medications, an ACE inhibitor to
control blood pressure, and medications to lower cholesterol. See Heart Bypass
Surgery Cost, supra note 408.
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to undergo a heart transplant costing $690,000410 and will pay even more
for advanced monitoring of his condition and anti-rejection medication in
the amount of $20,600 per year.411 Under the discretionary method that the
verdict form solution proposes, the man would likely recover $555,000 in
past medicals and $13,600 per year in future medicals.412 This result
appears to fairly compensate him, given that the doctor’s negligence gave
rise to those increased medical costs.
Under the percentage probability method, however, the man’s
recovery could be quite different. Perhaps the jury finds that he lost a 10%
chance of receiving a coronary bypass rather than a heart transplant. He
would recover $69,000 in past medicals (10% of $690,00) and $2,060 per
year in future medicals (10% of $20,600). Even if the jury found that a
higher percent chance was lost—perhaps around 20%—the patient would
still receive far less than what would make him whole: $138,000 in past
medicals (20% of $690,000) and $4,120 in future medicals (20% of
$20,600). Accounting for the fact that this patient can no longer work, the
percentage probability method clearly falls short of making him whole.
Under different facts, the percentage probability method may yield a
more balanced result, but because the lost chance inquiry is so factintensive, it is best left to the jury’s discretion.413 Thus, the verdict form
solution accounts for the unique calculations inherent in each lost chance
case and assures that the plaintiffs will receive medical expenses to which
they are entitled because of the defendant’s negligence, but no more. The
verdict form allows the jury to calculate medical expenses separately from
general damages, safeguarding the principles of appellate reviewability
and just compensation.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years after Smith, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Burchfield
reached a decision that fell short of the Louisiana Legislature’s intent.414
410. The Burchfield Court noted that the court of appeal was correct to find
that the plaintiff incurred a total of $692,850.24 in medical expenses for the heart
transplant itself. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 868.
411. The Burchfield Court also noted that there was evidence to find that future
medications resulting from the plaintiff’s heart transplant would total $1,718.78
per month—which totals $20,625.36 per year. Id.
412. The calculation would go as follows: (1) past medicals ($690,000 –
$135,000 = $555,000); and (2) future medicals ($20,600 – $7,000= $13,600 per
year).
413. Aagaard, supra note 138, at 1355.
414. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 548 (La. 1996).
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The MMA cap’s exception for medical expenses was meant to compensate
severely injured plaintiffs that the cap drastically affected; thus, moving
forward, the legislature’s intent must guide the interpretation of
Louisiana’s lost chance doctrine.415 Since the lost chance claim has
evolved since Smith, the courts require a nuanced approach to account for
the distinction between the two injuries present in a lost chance case: the
medical expenses incurred as a result of a physician’s negligence and the
lost chance itself.416
If the Burchfield Court had allowed the jury to calculate damages
through the proposed special verdict form, the plaintiff would have
recovered what the jury believed his subjective lost claim was worth.417
Additionally, the plaintiff would have recovered a portion of the medical
expenses he was required to pay for the continued treatment of his heart
condition.418 To revitalize the lost chance doctrine, Louisiana should adopt
a method that allows for a medical expense calculation separate from
general damages in lost chance claims. A verdict form that mandates
separate jury awards as the paradigm for valuation would most adequately
compensate for both categories of losses—special and general damages—
while still leaving the fact-finding role to the jury.

415.
416.
417.
418.
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